The SPE has split the former "Management & Information" technical discipline into two new technical discplines:
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The development of the van der Waals (VDW) cubic equation of state (EOS) more than century ago was a watershed moment in the prediction of volumetric, thermodynamic and phase equilibrium properties of fluids. A brief account of the historical contributions to EOS development prior to VDW is offered. The equation proposed by Johannes Diderik van der Waals in his celebrated thesis presented in 1873 at the University of Leiden is then analyzed. A chronological walk through of the most important developments in cubic EOS from the early 1900s to present is summarized. The application of cubic EOS to mixtures and the development of mixing rules are briefly described.
The development of the van der Waals (VDW) cubic equation of state (EOS) more than century ago was a watershed moment in the prediction of volumetric, thermodynamic and phase equilibrium properties of fluids. A brief account of the historical contributions to EOS development prior to VDW is offered. The equation proposed by Johannes Diderik van der Waals in his celebrated thesis presented in 1873 at the University of Leiden is then analyzed. A chronological walk through of the most important developments in cubic EOS from the early 1900s to present is summarized. The application of cubic EOS to mixtures and the development of mixing rules are briefly described.
Heerema Marine Contractors has been awarded Statements of Feasibility by DNV GL for two offshore foundation concepts that it has been developing with the assistance of the University of Dundee. The two concepts, which the Dutch company has termed "silent foundations," are aimed at installation without the loud hammering typical of installation of pile foundations for offshore structures. Such noise can harm marine life, and existing noise-mitigation systems often produce carbon dioxide. The systems under development, termed push-in piles and helical or screw piles, reflect an initiative by the Leiden-based company to support environmentally sustainable marine operations. The Statements of Feasibility represent the first formal step toward qualification of the concepts for field use.
The level to which a company prioritizes safe behaviors and environmentally responsible operations is a good indicator of how it will handle potential incidents and accidents. As such, establishing a robust safety culture is vital to a company's overall development, an expert said. As part of the SPE Distinguished Lecturer Program, Patrick Hudson, a professor at Leiden University and a consultant in human factors and safety management, discussed the types of safety culture found in organizations and the ways in which companies can improve their handling of noncompliant behaviors by employees. Hudson described a good safety culture as mindful, respectful, just, and fair, a culture wherein clear lines between acceptable and unacceptable behavior are defined. It begins with the leadership's establishment of a working environment based on respect and transparency. Managers should let their employees know the company's stand on managing risks and allow them to admit their mistakes.
This article, written by Special Publications Editor Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 179255, “The Influence of Communicating About Safety Measures on Risk- Taking Behavior,” by Jop Groeneweg, SPE, and Emma ter Mors, Leiden University, prepared for the 2016 SPE International Conference and Exhibition on Health, Safety, Security, Environment, and Social Responsibility, Stavanger, 11–13 April. The paper has not been peer reviewed. Risk-taking behavior is an important contributing human factor to incidents and is notoriously difficult to influence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people have a hard-wired optimal perceived risk level. People compensate for risk-reducing measures by behaving in a riskier fashion until the desired level of risk is reached again. This study looked at the effect of the number of shields of protection and uncertainty on the risk-taking behavior of the participants. Introduction The main aim of safety research is to identify ways to prevent accidents and to ensure the safety of workers. Human error—or, in other words, unsafe behavior—has been found to be a major cause of accidents, and its elimination, therefore, is a prime goal for improving safety. The human factor is most effectively addressed by tackling the organizational system instead of focusing on incorrect actions by individuals. An effective strategy is to increase the level of protection or the number of safety barriers. The concept of the safety barrier features most prominently in the Swiss-cheese metaphor of accident causation. The Swiss-cheese model describes accidents as being caused by unchecked hazards that are allowed to cause losses. A series of barriers is placed between the hazard and that which may be harmed. The barriers keep the hazard under control and prevent it from causing harm. However, these barriers are always less than 100% adequate and contain weaknesses or holes. The barriers, therefore, often are compared to slices of Swiss cheese. Unlike real Swiss cheese, the holes in the barriers are dynamic and open and close at random. When these holes in the barriers are aligned, a path is created, leading to a potential accident. Intuitively, one would assume that safety improves proportionally both to the protection measures taken and to the improvements in the design of such measures. The more protective equipment given to the workers, the safer they will be, either because of a reduced risk of accident or because such measures mitigate the effects of accidents. This approach assumes that human error can arise from unintended actions such as memory lapses and attention failures. However, it can also be attributed partly to intended actions such as risk taking. The question addressed in this paper is related to the extent to which people’s risk-taking behavior was influenced by their awareness of the numerous preventive interventions in place. The pivotal issue that arises is whether people adapted their risk-taking behavior as a result of their awareness of the number, and of the effectiveness, of the barriers in place.
Abstract Biofuels can play a very important role to diversify the energy supply in the transportation sector, currently almost fully based on fossil fuels. In this context, the production and use of different biofuels have been increasing around the world. Nowadays, the biofuels produced and consumed in large quantity are ethanol from sugar and amylaceous biomass and biodiesel from vegetable oils and animal fats, which substitute gasoline and diesel oil, respectively. In 2010, the global biofuels production reached 114 billion liters, of which around 15% corresponded on biodiesel. A relevant issue associated to biofuels adoption is related to their effective sustainability of biofuels, in comparison to the conventional fuels. In this context, the objective of this study was to evaluate and compare the main environmental impacts and energy flows of ethanol from sugarcane and biodiesel from soybean and palm oil, in Brazilian conditions, with their respective fuels substitutes (gasoline and diesel). The methodological tool used was the Life Cycle Analysis (LCA), in well-to-tank assessment. In addition, the results were compared by meta-analysis of previous published studies from others countries. The environmental analysis was done using the software SimaPro 7.0.1 and the CML 2 baseline 2000 methodology, developed by the University of Leiden. The environmental impacts were quantified and ranked in impact categories. Such ranking helped to identify and quantify the major impacts of the system and in each stage and proposing ways to reduce them. Finally, the results of the inventory analysis and the impact assessment were discussed. It was observed that production systems with higher agricultural yields and allows the use of co-products in its cycle had best results.
Abstract A Spar was selected for the Perdido Development during system selection in 2005 to provide a stable platform for direct vertical access drilling and producing operations for the world's deepest drilling and production platform in nearly 8000 feet of water. A combination polyester / chain mooring system was selected to place less vertical load on the floating structure (compared to a steel mooring system), which results in less payload on the structure and a lower overall cost solution for the project's host platform. The transportation and installation of the Perdido Spar and moorings was completed during 2008. A number of records were set during the installation campaign including the world's deepest Spar installed in 7817 feet of water and the world's deepest permanent mooring pile in 8631 feet of water. Challenges of interest to the offshore industry that contributed to the uniqueness of the Perdido Spar and moorings were:Impacts of Topsides single lift on the Spar design and weight management Safety management given a project goal of zero recordable injuries Ultra deep water location with increased environmental requirements and significant seafloor hazards Polyester permanent mooring system Spar fixed ballast installation accuracy Spar installation during hurricane season This paper will provide a broad overview of various aspects of the Perdido Development Spar and mooring system design, fabrication, transportation and installation while highlighting the main challenges encountered and lessons learned for future projects. Introduction The Perdido Spar is Shell's first Spar Host production platform, but has the benefits of being developed as a joint venture with Chevron and BP. Technip was selected as the Spar and Mooring contractor in April 2006 and began detailed design on their 14th Spar in June 2006. An EPC contract was awarded to Technip USA in November 2006 for design, fabrication and dry transport of the Spar and Mooring work scope on the Perdido Development project. The Spar & Mooring Leads for Shell were primarily co-located with the Technip project management team at Technip's Woodbranch II PM&E office and in Shell's Woodcreek office in Houston. The Spar Fabrication Site Team was located at Technip Offshore Finland's yard in Mantyluoto, Finland. Working relationships with Technip were excellent and were developed early in the project through focused team building sessions in Finland and Houston. An alignment workshop primarily aimed at " incident and injury free?? safety management and working relationships was held in October 2006 and attended by the most senior management from both Shell and Technip. Heerema Marine Contractors (HMC) was selected in early 2006 as the transportation and installation contractor (excluding the dry tow from Finland). The Heerema project team was based in Leiden, The Netherlands while the Shell T&I team was based in Shell's Woodcreek office in Houston.
Abstract The Baker-panel investigation into the causes of the BP Texas refinery disaster made a clear statement to the scientific community: the existing tools were notable to generate the kind of results that the panel found acceptable. One of the problems they met was the limited scope of the present accident investigation tools: they were limited in their investigation process to the boundaries of organizational control. There is also a trend in the Western society to demand from investigators to expand their scope beyond the boundaries of the organizations directly involved. This paper will present a new way of thinking about investigations based on the Tripod theory about accident causation (‘Extended’), that facilitates investigators to reach beyond the traditional control boundaries in a valid and reliable manner. In ‘Extended’ the accident is investigated along lines of responsibilities and information flow. In ‘Extended’ the investigation is not focused on ‘what happened when?’ or ‘what caused an event’ but ‘who was responsible? and ‘what kind of information was available, how was it processed and what was done with it?’. It was developed by Leiden University for and tested by the Dutch Safety Board. The ‘Extended model’ was tested in six cases in a range of incidents in high-risk environments (e.g. aircraft accidents, an explosion of a gas plant and the grounding of a container carrier). The results show that the ‘Extended model’ is a valid model which allows identification of latent failures and fallible decision-making on all levels of involved organizations, which are either directly or indirectly involved through policies and regulations. The results also show that the fallible decision-making process can be used for explaining management decision-making within the boundaries of the organization: fallible decision-making on organizational level, as well as explaining lack or inadequacy of (non-)governmental interference. In a full implementation of the model more than 40% of extra factors have been identified (compared with a more traditional analysis) that could be used to generate items for prevention.
This article, written by Technology Editor Dennis Denney, contains highlights of paper SPE 98457, "Assessment of a Targeted Approach to Preventing Malaria in the Oil and Gas Industry: Responses to a Web-Based Questionnaire," by A. Barbey, SPE, Schlumberger; A.H.E. Roukens, Leiden U. Medical Center;J. Berg, Shell Health Services; and S. Cannegieter and L. Visser, Leiden U. Medical Center, prepared for the 2006 SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 2–4 April. Following the death from malaria of four of its expatriate employees while they were in nonmalarious countries, an oilfield service company developed a targeted, multicomponent malaria-prevention program. The program comprises two levels of malaria training, malaria arrival and departure quizzes, a malaria hot line, and a curative malaria kit (CMK). The cornerstone of the program is the CMK, which contains a diagnostic test that employees can use to diagnose malaria in minutes and standby (emergency) curative medication. Introduction Every year, malaria caused by the parasite Plasmodium falciparum infects 300 to 500 million people and kills between one and two million, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of South America, and in southeast Asia. Among the expatriate population working or living in these malarious areas of the world, malaria is a major occupational illness, responsible for numerous lost days and several deaths within the oil and gas industry every year. Falciparum malaria can kill non-immune individuals within a few days if not treated immediately. Because the symptoms of malaria are not unique—fever, shivering, joint pain, and headache—and they do not occur until 7 to 60 days after infection, malaria is easily misdiagnosed or improperly treated. Most of the expatriate deaths occur not in the malarious country where the disease was transmitted by the bite of an infected mosquito, but in nonmalarious countries where the infected expatriates have traveled for work or days off. Four employees died of malaria between 2000 and 2002. All deaths took place outside of the malarious locations where the disease was contracted and in countries where the fatal form of malaria is not endemic. Following these deaths, a task force was created within the company with the aim of attaining and maintaining the goal of zero malaria deaths. The result was development of a malaria-prevention program based on the company's comprehensive quality, health, safety, and environment management system. The program pro vides processes and tools to fulfill the requirements of each of the system's eight elements. Components of the program are two levels of malaria training, malaria arrival and departure quizzes, a set of auditable malaria-prevention-program guidelines, and two innovative tools not previously used in oilfield malaria prevention: a malaria hot line and a CMK. The malaria-prevention program was distributed by the oilfield service company to its international employees and their dependents and to its contractors working in high-malaria-risk areas. Since the prevention program began in early 2003, the service company has reported no malaria deaths within its employee/contractor population.
Abstract Regulators, researchers and professionals in the oil and gas industry all agree on the importance of leadership commitment to HSSE. The right safety leadership is the most important factor in building a strong HSSE culture, but historically the focus has been on the workforce through traditional behavior based safety programmes. What this paper does is explain a tool Seeing Yourself As Others See You, which gives leaders personal feedback on whether they are seen to walk the talk, know what the issues are in their organization, build trust and put a priority on safety. This tool has been developed over a number of years by the Universities of Aberdeen, Manchester and Leiden as well as the UK Step Change initiative and Shell International Exploration and Production. One component is a web-based tool, developed and supported by Leiden University, to ensure the confidentiality of the information submitted. This also allows the tool to be used by other organizations. The most important element is the follow-up coaching sessions, which is initiated by the manager, following simple and psychologically sound guidance. These sessions lead from general feedback to specific actions that positively change the way others view a manager's commitment to safety. The results have been:Challenging senior manager's beliefs and perceptions of themselves by confronting them with how others see them Hundreds of senior managers have been appraised, many on an annual basis A profile of leadership commitment to safety over time and obvious changes in the behavior of some managers A correlation between scores and safety performance Based on demand from other companies the methodology described in this paper is now available to the industry through the Energy Institute. Introduction This paper reviews the conclusions of previous safety leadership research, summarizing what successful safety leaders do. It then describes how these lessons can be applied to senior managers through the development of a tool and presents pan-industry data. The tool described here is Seeing Yourself As Others See You and forms part of the Hearts and Minds suite previously presented at SPE conferences[1–3]. This tool is designed to measure safety leadership and commitment and is used to help managers become more effective in demonstrating their safety leadership behavior. Leadership vs. Management One aspect that can differentiate or categorize organizations, often more completely than the work they do, is the leadership of the people in charge. Leadership is arguably the most important determinant of an organization's culture and ultimately of its success or failure. For this reason Leadership is one of the oldest areas of research in the social sciences[4]. A variety of leadership theories have been proposed and studied in general terms and many linked to performance outcomes in the management literature[5] but only a few leadership studies have been related to safety outcomes[6] with little work published on the role of senior managers[7–9]. The discussion of leadership, especially within safety research has been confused by the interchangeable use of the term with "management," as these two descriptors refer to different functions and behaviors within an organization[10]. In many organizations most people in management positions are called leaders and the confusion around these terms implies that everyone in a management position can provide leadership, which is not necessarily the case. Leaders tend to influence commitment levels, whereas managers exercise authority and hold people accountable.