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Collaborating Authors
ExxonMobil has traditionally used industry standards driven by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to classify safety events on the basis of the treatment or restrictions provided. However, this treatment-based approach has limitations. With its focus on administrative reporting and incident-escalation management, the approach does not naturally resonate with workforce members to enable desired cultural changes. A hurt-based approach has been adopted to mitigate the limitations of the treatment-based approach. In the treatment-based approach to personnel safety, an incident, from the treatment or restrictions provided, is classified as a lost-time incident (LTI), restricted-work incident (RWI), medical-treatment incident (MTI), first aid, no treatment, near miss, or unsafe act/unsafe condition.
- Energy > Oil & Gas (0.74)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (0.55)
Abstract Low-Probability High-Consequence (LPHC) events are accidents that are unexpected, with few similar historical events; however, when they do happen the impact is extreme. With few prior events available to learn from, it can be difficult for a single company or organization to completely understand, manage and fully mitigate the risks involved with LPHC events. This is because they do not have enough learning opportunities to improve their overall risk management performance, and properly address the hazards. Part of the problem in managing against LPHC events occurring has been the lack of appropriate metrics. While efforts are underway by industry to develop a suite of Process Safety metrics, there is still a gap where Operational Safety is concerned. The author proposes that the best way to reduce the risks is by working issues at a sector or total industry level, rather than on a company by company basis. At an industry sector level there is greater knowledge and awareness of a larger number of previous events and a broader group of experts to develop industry practices and risk management guidelines. Examples are given of how successful this concept has been for a specific hazard, then at a national level, and finally in the geophysical sector of the oil and gas industry between the International Association of Geophysical Contractors (IAGC) HSE&S Steering Committee and International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) Geophysical HSSE Sub-committee, where contractors and operators have worked together on Health, Safety, Security and Environmental (HSSE) issues for a number of years. The oil and gas industry can improve its overall safety performance for LPHC events by working at a global sector level, or even globally across the industry by better sharing of the right kind of information on incidents. In addition, industry should capture the key aspects and lesson learned in databases that can then be used for several purposes: to drive the development of guidance documents; to help create improved and more consistent risk assessments across industry; to help develop the improved metrics still needed for Operational Safety, and potentially to guide any new regulatory requirements. To accomplish all of this on a global basis may require the creation of a new industry body. It is worth bearing in mind what occurred in the US after the Three Mile Island nuclear incident. The nuclear power industry was at risk, and it established the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) in 1979, with a mission to "promote the highest levels of safety and reliability – to promote excellence – in the operation of commercial nuclear power plants". In the 30 years since INPO was established it has built an excellent safety and reliability record, but they are still cognizant of continuing challenges. The best way forward may be to establish a similar but global body for the world-wide oil and gas industry.
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Safety > Operational safety (0.88)
- Reservoir Description and Dynamics > Reservoir Characterization > Seismic processing and interpretation (0.81)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > HSSE management systems (0.68)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > HSSE reporting (0.68)
On initial consideration, one might reasonably ask: What can the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) contribute to the oil and gas industry? About 3 years ago, a senior principal at Deloitte Advisory's Energy & Resources Operational Risk Group reached out to NASA to better understand the safety culture at NASA with the intent of understanding how that culture might translate to oil and gas operations. Very quickly, the conversation expanded to the realm of risk management. Working with Deloitte, NASA came to appreciate the remarkable similarities between an offshore deepwater facility and the International Space Station. Both exist in extremely hostile environments.
- Government > Space Agency (1.00)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas (1.00)
- North America > United States > Gulf of Mexico > Central GOM > West Gulf Coast Tertiary Basin > Shenandoah Basin > Walker Ridge > Block 52 > Shenandoah Field (0.99)
- North America > United States > Gulf of Mexico > Central GOM > West Gulf Coast Tertiary Basin > Shenandoah Basin > Walker Ridge > Block 51 > Shenandoah Field (0.99)
Abstract This paper discusses the challenges encountered in the completion of a port reconstruction project in a West African country. On a US$150M aid project, undertaken by a range of international contractors, a major concern surfaced with respect to the existing LPG installation in the port as well as the proximity of a neighboring sulfur store. This paper examines the issues and consequences of integrating the risks into a reworked construction plan that assured an acceptable level of safety was achieved, if at some major political cost. The paper provides an example of the successful implementation of what had started as a relatively straightforward port project and developed into an extremely high-risk program as the oil and gas hazards became clear. An onshore LPG storage facility in the port (3000 m and 200 m) was identified as a major hazard that had not been considered in the original plans as it had been seen as a separate independent port activity. In the absence of sufficient information about the integrity of the facility an independent audit was undertaken. The findings were so grave, including a significant risk of uncontrolled fire and explosion, that a shutdown of both the entire construction site and the gas facility were demanded by the contractor and supported by the client. As the LPG facility provided a major source of LPG supply for 5 African nations, there was considerable pressure from the highest political levels to keep the facility in operation. The worst consequence initially identified was a Boiling Liquid Expansive Vapor Explosion (BLEVE). After this risk had been identified a search for other hazards revealed a sulfur storage dump (± 10,000 tons) that, if ignited by a BLEVE posed a risk that was of catastrophic potential, putting a quarter of the population of the capital city (± 1.2M people) at significant risk from the combustion products of burning sulfur. The paper discusses the physical and political knock-on consequences of the 8-week shutdown as well as the potential consequences on the port, the surrounding city and 5 countries if there had been a BLEVE. This paper aims to explore this potential and understand how close to an all out disaster this was. One lesson was the necessity of identifying and assessing all the hazards generated by oil and gas operations even when they do not appear to be relevant at first sight.
- North America > United States (1.00)
- Africa (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Downstream (1.00)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (0.46)
In marine design safety, decisions are based largely on the experience of the designers, expressed in a semi-formal way. Dangers are inherent in this approach, in that there is a possibility of overlooking catastrophic failure scenarios. This paper investigates a procedure dedicated to design for safety and describes its practical application to the marine design process. The developed formal safety assessment system comprises various well established safety assessment methods and statistical techniques, which in combination facilitate a novel, holistic and practical approach in incorporating safety aspects at the initial design stages. The system has been developed in the context of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) rescue vessel design process and was validated using various rescue vessel case studies. The formal safety assessment system and the supporting software written to facilitate its implementation are now being fully used in the development of current RNLI rescue vessel designs.