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During the investigation of several notable disasters (e.g., 1986 Chernobyl nuclear re-lease, Continental Express Flight 2574 crash in 1991), the lack of positive corporate safety culture was identified as a major contributing factor to these incidents (IAEA, 1986, as cited in Cox & Flin, 1998; NTSB/AAR-92/04 1992, p. 54, as cited by Meshkati, 1997). For example, as pointed out by National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), "the failure of Continental Express management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures" was a potential cause of the crash (NTSB/AAR-92/04 1992, p. 54, as cited by Meshkati, 1997). Since then, safety culture assessment has been frequently used to identify root causes of system failures or incidents (Cox & Flin, 1998; Gordon, Flin, Mearns, et al., 1996; Pidgeon, 1998; Wilpert, 2000). Accordingly, building a positive corporate safety culture has been an interest in nu-clear energy, offshore and other high-risk industries to improve safety awareness and prevent incidents (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Fleming, 1999; INSAG, 1999). Construction is well known as a high-risk field. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2011), in 2009, construction accounted for 18.3% of all fatal work injuries in the U.S. The industry's fatality rate (9.9 per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers) was the third highest among all industries. The emphasis on building a positive safety culture has proven to enhance contractors' safety awareness and performance. For example, the 1-Hour for Safety Management program, providing safety education for top management, successfully increased safety awareness, interest and commitment (Hakkinen, 1995). Job-site incidents were also reduced after a cultural intervention program was launched in the Netherlands' concrete industry (Oh & Sol, 2008). Corporate safety culture has gradually become a primary safety performance indicator (Mohamed, 2003; Reiman & Pietikeinen, 2010). This research's objective was two-fold:study a safety program launched by a regional general contractor (GC), Messer Construction Co. (here-after called "the GC"), in the U.S. building construction industry; and examine the program's effectiveness in building a positive safety culture based on a holistic assessment framework. This article presents an example of best safety management practices and offers an assessment tool that can be used to evaluate safety culture and safety program effectiveness.
- North America > United States > Wisconsin (0.28)
- Europe > Ukraine > Kyiv Oblast > Chernobyl (0.24)
- Research Report > New Finding (1.00)
- Questionnaire & Opinion Survey (1.00)
- Research Report > Experimental Study (0.68)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Sustainability/Social Responsibility > Integrating HSSE into the business (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Safety > Safety risk management (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > HSSE management systems (1.00)
Safety Risk Management of Drilling Operations
Zhang, Shaohui (PetroChina Research Institute of Petroleum Exploration & Development) | Teng, Xinxing (PetroChina Research Institute of Petroleum Exploration & Development) | Wang, Ling (E&D Research Institute of Liaohe Oilfield Company) | Wang, Shuai (China National Offshore Oil Corporation Research Institute) | Wen, Liangfan (China Petroleum Technology & Development Corporation)
Abstract Safety risks of drilling operations exist widely because of the hostile environment, ageing equiments, more challenging wells, human errors, etc. Failure to control or eliminate the safety risks may affect the drilling safety and lead to drilling accidents, resulting in enormous economic losses, or even casualties. Previous drilling accidents had shown great challenges of safety risk management, such as outdated management ideas and tools, poor awareness of safety risks, lack of effective safety risk information sharing and incomplete risk management system. In this paper, the potential safety risks associated with drilling facilities, workers, and management are figured out, and the corresponding risk management measures are formulated. Meanwhile, the guidelines for safety risk management of drilling operations are established. In addition, the guidelines are combined with the information technology, and the Web and mobile versions of the intelligent safety risk management software of drilling operations are designed and developed. The safety inspector in drilling sites can use mobile terminals to identify the drilling risks, being recorded in the form of text, pictures, video and other documents, and choose the risk control and mitigation measures. The safety management staff in the company can monitor the results of chosen measures in time by using the Web version, and provide effective and timely technical support for the field’s safety risk management if necessary. With the use of the intelligent safety risk management software of drilling operations, the two-way communication and safety risk information sharing between drilling sites and drilling safety management departments can be realized. A complete drilling safety risk management system can also be gradually developed in the process of risk identification, record, report, analysis, control, mitigation and prevention. The intelligent safety risk management software of drilling operations has been applied in some oilfields, and reveals excellent application prospects. Being an intelligent management tool, the software system can significantly improve the safety risk management efficiency, and finally realize the informational management of safety risks in drilling operations.
- Asia > China (0.69)
- North America > United States (0.47)
Introduction Over and over again many well-intended and otherwise well run companies fail to achieve even modest safety goals. Some of these organizations expend disproportionate amounts of time and money in futile – and sometimes counterproductive – safety efforts. Why do they fail? Nearly 40 years of developing, implementing, and, perhaps most instructively, assessing safety programs and activities, has convinced me that there are four repetitive – and fatal – mistakes that prevent safety "success." Although there are undoubtedly an infinite number of mistakes an organization can make in managing safety, my experience has led me to view the following missteps as the most common and damaging. This presentation will discuss these pitfalls in considerable detail – including how to avoid them. Mistake #1: Safety is different. The management team of a large federal agency recently asked me why it was so difficult to attain, and sustain, safety goals and objectives. I answered with a question, "How do you manage anything successfully?" My point was that the same techniques used to achieve other goals, such as schedule or production, also work for safety. Why treat safety differently than other important organizational objectives? The late and revered safety management consultant, Dan Petersen, reinforced this point during a 2007 interview in Professional Safety. When the interviewer asked Dr. Petersen to name his favorite book on safety management he declined to name one. Instead he recommended basic works on management (Williamson 58). Dr. Petersen's position was, simply, why not apply to safety the same "plan, do, check, act" management approach recommended in basic management texts? Thirty years earlier Dr. Peterson also told us, "we don't really want safety first any more than we want safety last. In other words we do not want to think of safety as separate from other aspects of production." (Petersen, Techniques of Management 27) Surprisingly, however, even today safety is often treated as a gimmick, left to staff personnel or committees (rather than line managers) with little follow-up or management accountability for results – good or bad. No amount of contests, slogans, jingles, posters or promotions can substitute for integrating safety into the work and actively managing it in concert with other objectives important to the organization. Yet we continue to try. The missing safety system Webster tells us that a system is "a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole." Since most organizations want to stay in business, they have long recognized the importance of nurturing such a system for their business imperatives. As a result many companies generally do a fine job of managing their production targets, budget, and a whole spectrum of business goals and objectives. They identify plans and actions considered necessary to meet their goals. Then they establish effective methods to measure their progress, hold managers accountable, and take appropriate corrective action where indicated - continuously. They meet routinely to discuss progress and problems and to develop new or modified strategies for success based on this feedback.
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (0.95)
- Energy > Power Industry > Utilities > Nuclear (0.94)
- Law (0.93)
Introduction Management support, we all say we want it, need it, and can't do our jobs without it. Saying that management support is essential for safety "success" has in fact become a safety profession mantra. A majority, 51.2% according to a 2002 ASSE survey, (Kendrick/Pater 2) of safety professionals, however, don't believe they receive that support. But what do we mean by management support and, more importantly, what should we really expect from our management and how do we go about getting it? Is asking for support even the right question? As a staff/support function shouldn't safety professionals really be asking what they can do to support management? While there is nearly universal agreement among safety professionals regarding the importance of management support, there is scant agreement on just what that support should look like. Naturally, every employee wants and deserves the support of his or her management. Safety professionals are no different. We all want respect, decent remuneration and adequate resources to accomplish those tasks for which we are held accountable. What more do we want? Looking back on a 40-year career that started in the safety engineering department of a large insurance carrier and is now winding down as a very part time safety consultant, I've naturally come to some conclusions regarding safety management. Coloring those conclusions is the more than 30 years I spent as a manager. My management roles ranged from directing plant safety and emergency response staff to corporate responsibilities for nuclear safety oversight, independent ES&H assessment, training, and quality assurance. My first budget in excess of $1,000,000 was in 1981 and I know firsthand the challenges of safety responsibility for up to 200 employees. Further influencing my safety perspective are the 15 years I spent leading corporate oversight and assessment programs. This role included evaluation of corporate program effectiveness for everything from industrial and nuclear safety to maintenance.
Abstract Frontline leaders (e.g., shift supervisors) serve the critical role of being the conduit of information and instruction from management to the frontline workforce. From a safety perspective, they translate the company’s safety vision into how safety is actually executed in the crews. Even with this important role, it is rare that shift supervisors are empowered to be true safety leaders through developmental opportunities and the integration of safety leadership into their key performance indicators. For shift supervisors to take ownership of their crews’ safety and be influential safety culture change agents, effective safety leadership needs to be clearly defined and assessed so that targeted interventions can be implemented. This paper describes an ongoing research program on safety leadership that was initiated in an attempt to define the dimensions of effective safety leadership for frontline leaders, create an assessment to measure frontline leaders’ safety leadership, and inform evidence-based interventions to develop the safety leadership of specifically shift supervisors. Based on this research program, the paper addresses the following topics: The eight dimensions of safety leadership, grounded in safety science and organizational psychology. The distinction between safety compliance and safety citizenship as two safety performance domains impacted by safety leadership. The results of a research study examining the impact of safety leadership on important safety factors like team safety climate and safety performance. Potential intervention opportunites to develop the safety leadership skills of shift supervisors. Shift supervisors represent an excellent opportunity to foster strong positive safety climates within work crews and drive exemplary frontline safety performance. The research program described in this paper focuses specifically on how to turn shift supervisors into effective safety leaders.
- Management > Professionalism, Training, and Education > Personnel competence (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Sustainability/Social Responsibility > Integrating HSSE into the business (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Safety > Human factors (engineering and behavioral aspects) (1.00)