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Abstract Process Safety Management Integrated Into Basic Research and Development Background Process safety management (PSM) attempts to prevent major accidents involving large volumes, multiple injuries and significant damage. Laboratory research focuses on small experiments, typically followed by scaling up to bench scale demonstrations, and the successful projects are often optimised on pilot scale. The typical process engineer is not highly involved in the laboratory phase of the research, and the research chemist is seldom involved in the operation of the plant, especially from a process safety perspective. This presentation shows how Sasol Technology R&D integrates these two aspects to allow the R&D phase of the development process to address safety concerns. This enables the design team to introduce safeguards as early as possible in the design. There are several published examples of major accidents that illustrate where better knowledge of the process could have contributed to preventing the accident. I will use two of these examples to illustrate the development of a set of questions that aim to address the possible problems at the experimental planning stage. The success of such a process could eliminate the need to retrofit solutions to the design. Sasol Technology R&D uses a Stage-Gate model to plan and evaluate projects. This model evaluates and develops an idea for possible commercialisation in distinct phases. In broad terms, the evaluation points are: Gate A - the idea has merit. This is mostly theoretical, often derived from literature. Gate B - the concept has been proven in a laboratory. Passing gate B enables the allocation of multiple resources. Gate C - the concept has been proven to be commercially viable. The research team has collected all the information needed to start scaling up and piloting can commence. Gate D - the process has been proven on a semi-industrial scale, and a commercial plant is possible. Most of the laboratory work is done in Stage C, which is between Gate B and Gate C. The program that covers Stage C can span years of experimental work, and the team reviews the project continuously during this stage. The Stage-Gate model now contains the PSM-related questions, and allows resource allocation to investigate these aspects. Consequences of failure There are many examples in the world where PSM failures caused catastrophic losses to human life, the environment and capital investments. This paper will use two well known examples to highlight where better knowledge could have helped to prevent these accidents. These examples are used as background, and will be discussed in detail, even though they are well known. This is done to make it easy for the reader to follow the arguments derived from the example case studies.
Abstract Over its 27 year history, the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has observed repeatedly that the first step towards implementing a strong process safety management program is obtaining top management commitment to process safety. CCPS has learned that communicating the business case for process safety is an important part of the process of obtaining this commitment. Work conducted by CCPS has demonstrated four key ways that process safety can have positive business benefits. Two of these benefits are qualitative; they can't be measured precisely, but they clearly impact business and financial performance. Two additional benefits are quantitative; they provide financial impact which can be readily identified. All four ways combine to make a compelling case for obtaining top management support for a strong process safety management system. This paper will discuss the four business benefits of process safety, and will include the results of recent investigations.
- Law (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- Banking & Finance (1.00)
Abstract Within the Shell Group of companies (Shell), keeping people safe at work is a deeply held value and the company actively pursues the goal of no harm to people. Shell actively works to build a culture where every employee and contractor takes responsibility for making this goal possible – it is called "Goal Zero". After reviewing work-related fatalities that occurred, Shell found that failure to comply with safety rules was a significant factor in the majority of these incidents. In response, and as the next step in the Goal Zero journey, Shell launched 12 Life-Saving Rules in 2009 across the Shell group. They were not new rules but were promoted in such a way to increase awareness of the importance of following the rules and to drive compliance in the areas with the highest risk of fatal injury. They set clear expectations about what employees and contractors and their supervisors must know and do to prevent injuries or fatalities. Compliance is mandatory for all Shell employees and contractors while on Shell business or sites. The guiding principle of the Life-Saving Rules is "if you choose to break the rules, you choose not to work for Shell". Following the launch in 2009, Shell's lost time injury frequency (LTIF) reduced from 2008 until 2011 by 40% to 0.36 and the fatal incident rate (FAR) reduced by 71% to 0.96 fatalities per 100 million exposure hours. By comparison, LTIF and FAR reduction in the rest of the Oil and Gas the industry was less marked, at 21% and 39% respectively. Although the long-term sustainability of this reduction still needs to be proven, the introduction of the Life-Saving rules provide a rare example of a safety related intervention with statistically and practical significant results. According to statistics the Life-Saving Rules helped to save about 13–29 lives in 2010 and 2011. This paper describes the research, the implementation strategy and learning's for the organization from the Life-Saving Rules implementation.
Abstract Many organizations try to prevent reoccurrence of incidents by analyzing incidents and implement recommendations based in their findings. Unfortunately this approach is not without pitfalls. Between ‘reporting’ and ‘evaluation of the effect of actions’ there are several hurdles to be taken. Only by looking at all the steps in the process organizations can ‘learn from incidents’. This contrasts with the traditional view that success can be achieved by looking at a limited number of factors, e.g. ‘the tool’ itself. Furthermore, organizations mistakenly believe that by formally zorganizing each of the steps they take away the hurdles. A checklist was generated aimed at the identification of the hurdles in the learning from incident process. Several hundred safety professionals in the Netherlands and employees in a tank storage company were asked to identify the so called ‘bottlenecks’ in their own organization and describe if each of the steps has been formally organized and how it worked in practice. Interviews with focus groups were held to identify causes of the hurdles. The learning potential from accidents is reduced, many of the steps in the learning from incidents process have flaws. This cannot be improved by taking one weak link out, only an approach that takes all steps into account can significantly improve the learning potential of organizations. Furthermore, the level of formal organizations has little predictive value for the ‘real situation’. Learning from incidents is of key importance for organizations to prevent their reoccurrence. This paper will describe the ‘learning from incident process’, will describe the main hurdles and their causes and will help organizations understand why ‘Its not the tool’ and why formal organization is not sufficient to guarantee success.
- Questionnaire & Opinion Survey (0.66)
- Overview (0.46)
Abstract When it comes to assessing risks in the oilfield industry, the usual focus is on mechanical, chemical, physical, and even biological and ergonomic risks. Psychosocial risks at work are usually disregarded or neglected. However, some psychosocial risks can be real problems for organizations and could have clear negative impacts on employee performance. Assessing these risks and defining whether they are acceptable is the first step. If they endanger workforce health or morale, action must be taken to obtain positive outcomes and to solve the problems. An additional consideration is that problems derived from inadequate handling of these risks can constitute acute or chronic medical conditions, affecting employees in field operations, or increasing accidents or diminishing productivity for organizations. An oilfield services company has been conducting workplace psychosocial risks assessments, using the simple but effective FPSICO questionnaire. The FPSICO questionnaire, from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Seguridad e Higiene en el Trabajo (National Institute of Safety and Hygiene at Work; INSHT), is a tool for identifying and assessing psychosocial risks at work. Its aim is to provide information to identify these risks in a particular situation, taking into consideration the task, the time devoted to the task, and the structure of the organization, and then to diagnose psychosocial risks either for the whole or only a particular area of an organization from the individual questionnaires. This paper discusses the results of a psychosocial risks assessment using the FPSICO questionnaire at the oilfield services company in a South American country, from the initial sampling through extrapolation to the whole organization in this country, for first-stage results and then a follow-up control four years later. Particular focus is placed on mental load (intellectual activity level required to perform the job) and temporal autonomy (inability to abandon the task and to self-manage time) based on the results of the initial assessment.
- South America (0.47)
- Europe (0.28)
- North America (0.28)
Abstract The Oil and Gas E&P industry has embarked upon the journey to a zero incident workplace. SPE has taken a leading role by organizing forums such as "Getting to Zero - An Incident-Free Workplace: How Do We Get There?" To date, the industry has not yet reached its desired destination. This paper will describe five common opportunities for improvement in organizations that seek to reach the zero incident goal. A systematic examination of a large number of incident and accident investigation reports from a variety of E&P companies and contractors has been conducted, including both near miss and loss events. The analysis identified consistent areas where responses to an unplanned event are not effective in terms of likely reduction in future probability of the event reoccurring. This was found to be the case in a significant proportion of the event reports examined. The issues are common across all segments of the E&P industry examined. By understanding and addressing the identified barriers to success, the E&P industry will be better able to progress the journey to zero.
Abstract Most models of how accidents are caused can be traced back to models such as Heinrich's Domino Theory and the Iceberg. What these models imply is that preventing one or more precursors of an incident is sufficient to prevent such incidents. The notion that there is a root cause of an incident is embedded in the idea that incident causation is linear and deterministic, that there are clear sequences of causes going back to a root cause. This thinking has been very successful and its application may be regarded as reducing the number of (potential) accidents by 80%. Most of these accidents are personal and the development and use of the Swiss Cheese model, aimed also at process incidents, has led to a reduction of possibly 80% of the remaining incidents, covering some 96% in total. Such models are still deterministic, but non-linear in their attribution of causation. The remaining 4% of possible incidents, especially complex and major process accidents, unfortunately appears to be much more intractable. The proposal is that these incidents have a causal structure that is both non-linear and non-deterministic, being inherently probabilistic. This has consequences for the management and prevention of such incidents, including the fact that simpler approaches leave them very hard to manage, despite considerable commitment. This paper explains the different models of how accidents are caused, why people may find the newer models difficult to understand, and the consequences for management that may enable us to actually achieve target zero.
- North America > United States (1.00)
- Europe > Netherlands > South Holland (0.46)
- Transportation (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- Government (0.93)
Abstract The opening of the Barents Sea for oil and gas exploration and development has been a controversial topic of social debate in Norway, particularly due to environmental and fisheries interests. A zero tolerance regime for oil spills has been introduced in this Northern Region, which means that every effort should be made to avoid oil spills. Eni Norge is presently developing the Goliat oil field in the Barents Sea and production is planned to start in 2013. The Goliat field is the very first production oil field in the Barents Sea. SINTEF has developed a method for establishing proactive safety indicators for monitoring of risk of oil spills at the Goliat field. As all possible accident scenarios cannot be foreseen in advance, particularly with new challenges such as oil production in Arctic areas, Eni Norge needs to prepare for the unexpected. This is why a resilience perspective (i.e. capability of recognizing, adapting to, and coping with the unexpected) has been pursued in developing the safety indicators. The potential benefit of the proposed method has been demonstrated using the Deepwater Horizon accident as an evaluation case. The main difference from other similar work is the focus on coping with the unexpected – building on the research on resilience. The information provided in this paper is applicable to any development and use of proactive safety indicators in the oil and gas industry. The first application – also used during the development of the method – is the Goliat oil field in the Barents Sea. The paper presents the conclusions from the evaluation of the safety indicator method using the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) accident as case. The evaluation shows the relevance of this resilience based method, in particular the general resilience issues being a central part of the method. It shows that indicators for the proposed general issues could have provided early warnings for the Deepwater Horizon accident. The significance of the work is the provision of (resilience based) proactive safety indicators to prevent accidents in the future.
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (0.68)
- North America > United States > Gulf of Mexico > Central GOM > East Gulf Coast Tertiary Basin > Mississippi Canyon > Block 252 > Macondo Field > Macondo 252 Well (0.99)
- Europe > Norway > Barents Sea > Hammerfest Basin > PL 229 > Block 7122/8 > Goliat Field > Kapp Toscana Group > Realgrunnen Subgroup > Kapp Toscana Group > Realgrunnen Subgroup > Snadd Formation > Realgrunnen Subgroup > Tubåen Formation > Sassendalen Group > Kobbe Formation (0.99)
- Europe > Norway > Barents Sea > Hammerfest Basin > PL 229 > Block 7122/8 > Goliat Field > Kapp Toscana Group > Realgrunnen Subgroup > Kapp Toscana Group > Realgrunnen Subgroup > Snadd Formation > Realgrunnen Subgroup > Tubåen Formation > Klappmyss Formation > Kobbe Formation (0.99)
- (64 more...)
- Well Drilling > Pressure Management > Well control (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Safety > Operational safety (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > Contingency planning and emergency response (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Environment > Oil and chemical spills (1.00)
Abstract If the upstream petroleum industry wishes to retain its social licence to operate it should consider taking some additional steps to help prevent major accident events (MAEs). In Australia, establishing a Centre for Upstream Petroleum Safety (CUPS) based in Perth with an initial focus on human and organisational factors, safety culture and learning would be a concrete and substantive step forward to build capacity and capability. Internationally, an agreement among states and with industry is needed to require and protect reporting of more significant safety events, to systemically investigate MAEs and to promulgate lessons in a timely ‘no blame’ manner as occurs in aviation under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention. Better learning from past MAEs in oil and gas and from other high risk and high technology industries such as transport, nuclear, underground coal mining and petrochemicals is also crucial. Some examples of such MAEs are provided and key aspects of the billion dollar Varanus Island gas pipeline explosions that occurred in Western Australia in June 2008 are highlighted. Incorporating these into an active learning CUPS curriculum would help build local capacity and capability to prevent future MAEs.
- Europe (1.00)
- Oceania > Australia > Western Australia (0.48)
- North America > United States > Illinois > Cook County > Chicago (0.24)
- Government > Regional Government > Oceania Government > Australia Government (1.00)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- South America > Brazil > Rio de Janeiro > South Atlantic Ocean > Campos Basin > Area do 1-RJS-366 > Frade Block > Frade Field (0.99)
- North America > United States > Gulf of Mexico > Central GOM > East Gulf Coast Tertiary Basin > Mississippi Canyon > Block 252 > Macondo Field > Macondo 252 Well (0.99)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Safety > Human factors (engineering and behavioral aspects) (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > HSSE management systems (1.00)
- Facilities Design, Construction and Operation > Pipelines, Flowlines and Risers (1.00)
- (4 more...)
Abstract Increased motorization has increased the risk of road accidents.In Nigeria figures from the Federal Road Safety Commission show that accident rates increased from 4,673 in 2007 to 5,690 in 2009. Victims of avoidable road accidents cut across all strata of society. Given the socio-economic impact of Road Traffic Accidents, a collaborative approach to road safety offers the greatest opportunity for reducing road traffic crashes and raising road safety awareness in Nigeria. Government enforcement of Road Traffic Laws cannot totally eliminate the dangers of Road Crashes considering government's limited resources. A public partnership model offers the only viable and sustainable way of achieving a Safety conscious society. This paper shows how a partnership model for Road Safety is raising the bar in Safety advocacy in Nigeria. Since 2006, we have focused attention on building partnerships in Nigeria to tackle the issues of road safety in our communities. In Collaboration with the Government and across different spheres of the Business Community, we have succeeded in bringing together the right consensus for promoting road safety. Private-public partnership has proven successful in many areas of human endeavor. Our paper will share the challenges and successes we have faced as we built and launch the road safety coalition in Nigeria. We strongly believe that a collaborative approach to improving road safety can be successful and will make the desired impact. During this session we will discuss: ■The benefit of private-public sector collaboration to improve road safety ■Key learning regarding partnership ■Successes with our targeted road safety action plan ■Challenges of partnership and implementing road safety actions in Nigeria You will gain: ■An understanding on how strategic interventions can berth multi-sectoral partnerships to enhance road safety awareness. ■Knowledge of working partnership models for addressing road safety ■Understanding of how to begin building collaborative relationships between the public and private sector ■A good picture of how Governments and the Private Sector work together for Social Development in Nigeria. Thank you Muheez Olayinka Bello and Alex Opene
- Transportation > Ground > Road (1.00)
- Government > Regional Government > Africa Government > Nigeria Government (0.44)