When drilling and experiencing a well control event, the decision to either function the shear and seal BOP with pipe in the hole or evacuate the rig before shutting in the well is a complex one. Many human and technical influences come into play in a highly time dependent, often escalating situation. At this time pressured moment the crew concerned fully appreciates that the consequences of their actions are likely to be significant.
A new BOP activation technology has been developed and tested to assist the operations team in making better (safer) decisions at this critically unsafe time. The paper will explain the core system components and detail the testing methodology adopted to facilitate field introduction of this new technology in Saudi Arabia.
At its core, a bespoke safety critical wireless communications solution has been developed which when coupled to robust electrical control and hydraulic power unit hardware, provides a rig upgrade solution when the planned well conditions warrant. It should be noted that the system is a supplementary well control technology designed to operate alongside existing, conventional BOP control systems as opposed to other attempted methods that seek to replace reliable, proven and heavily regulated equipment. The technology is novel in that no technology has been previously developed and tested that allows well shut-in following rig evacuation on land or jack-up rig installations.
Significant learnings captured during the development project, including the testing phase will be shared, with a look forward to full operational deployment considerations such as integration with existing rig technology.
The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) is a global forum in which member companies identify and share best practices to achieve improvements in areas such as health, safety, the environment, security, social responsibility and operations. IOGP members encompass oil and gas companies, industry associations as well as major upstream service companies; collectively members produce 40% of the world's oil and gas.
The IOGP member companies voluntarily report their annual safety data, which is used to compile an annual safety performance indicators report. IOGP work groups have focused attention on using the safety performance indicator data to identify industry-wide learning to enable an industry vision of no fatalities.
This paper describes the trends and learnings from the data received. Having this large database of information and standardized reporting of fatality data by activity, category, Life Saving Rule and causal factors allows trending and analysis on a scale which is not possible for any individual member company. The paper provides an update on the upstream industry safety performance from the last seven years of data collected. A review is also provided of specific data sets which provide increased granularity in process and transportation safety for identifying trends and learning.
The paper also discusses how the IOGP have used the available upstream safety data to validate and refresh the industry Life Saving Rules. The IOGP Safety performance indicator data set is the largest database of its kind in the upstream oil and gas industry, allowing the ability to analyze trends and learning from fatal incidents on an industry-wide basis.
Have we learned from historical major incidents in the industry?
We are working in a learning organisation equipped with structures and procedures to ensure that lessons from major incidents are incorporated as organisational changes. The following lessons were captured; apply HSE case regime; adapt process safety concept to drilling operations; create and sustain well integrity throughout the entire well life cycle and choose the right leading and lagging indicators to measure and promote continuous improvement.
The heart of these lessons learnt are to establish a process of managing the major accident hazard risks throughout well life cycle. In effect, identify hazards, define safety critical elements, develop performance standards and establish the assurance and verification process. Ultimately, the records of these steps have been demonstrated in safety case document. All steps have been monitored, tracked and audited through the Well Integrity Management System (WIMS). In execution, the conducted program was an assessment of our current situation, taking into account lessons learnt from historical major incidents, close gaps and sustain performance. The deployment was conducted through four distinct phases: Assess, Define, Intervene, and Sustain.
The outcomes of execution of the program in our wells stock are managing and preserving well integrity throughout well life cycle phases rather than operation phase only; the percentage of non-healthy wells are reduced from 25% in 2013 to 5% in 2015; all contracted rigs have verified HSE Cases; new well integrity measures are applied. Moreover, all are contained, tracked and audited in WIMS.
The application of WIMS combines technical, operational and organizational barriers to prevent the uncontrolled flow of fluids to the surrounding environments or across subsurface formations throughout well life cycle.
To better control HSE risks of its complex operations, TOTAL E&P Angola hereinafter referred as TEPA (4 FPSOs, 630 kbopd in 2017) developed an Operational Global Risk Dashboard to provide a summary HSE view of operating sites. The tool was set to assist Top Management's decision making from risk trends and to identify situations displaying areas of concern.
While the first dashboard was composed of an exhaustive set of measurable data, its benefits were balanced by the delay and efforts spent to update it. The tool was rationalized by focusing only on two key components: the reliable data available in the Company HSE web database and the risk perception of the HSE Site Managers, responsible of HSE on site.
The dashboard consists of a global risk view which summarizes the operational risk indicators and a detailed risk view per asset. A qualitative risk evaluation of numerical data was considered, capturing the cumulative effects as a combination of three simple dimensions: quantity, criticality and trend. Four operational risk indicators cover the incidents recorded, with 3 different viewpoints (human consequences, high potential incidents and loss of primary containment) and the downgraded situations.
The risk perception of the HSE Site Manager is built through three major drivers of asset integrity: people, plant and processes. It is a valuable soft indicator, often complementary from the data analysis. It captures all the weak signals from the sites which might not be reflected within all the trends of available data.
The display with colored icons (green, orange and red) gives an immediate perception of the risk. It supports the Top Management to check if the appropriate corrective actions are undertaken by the operational entities or at least requesting additional risk mitigations on the identified red warnings. It also provides a qualitative means to analyze which parameter of ‘People, Plant & Processes’ needs to be reinforced.
This paper describes the unique engineering design, construction and environmental and social aspects implemented to develop the Chipirón TB oil field in Arauca, Colombia. This paper builds upon the design and construction aspects shared previously with the SPE to include the critical environmental and social factors integrated into the Occidental Colombia ("OxyCol" or "Occidental") risk management approach that have enabled learning and new innovative techniques from Chipirón to other projects. Using Occidental's Health, Environmental and Safety Management System (HESMS) to identify the project and surrounding socio-environmental risks is important so that a robust analysis of project risks leads to the development of mitigation approaches.
Saipem's life saving rules (LSR) have been well established in Saipem's processes and procedures for many years. However, the need for an effective campaign to transmit and embed them through the organization was recognized. An internal development team began to regenerate and precisely define the topics the LSRs should specifically target, focusing on how to critically define the way they could be released in an impactful way. This also extended into increasing competence. There are the two key campaign aims: the effective release of each LSR (one at a time over a 6-month period) and the building of the skills and knowledge needed to apply them. The challenge resided in communicating the rules across a multi-language workforce with impact, whilst creating engagement. The'core rules' were transmitted through highly impactful and interactive film clips, demonstrating the rule violation leading to an accident, pausing for group led discussion and reflection, before again proceeding to demonstrating the correct approach. The films were dubbed into 11 different languages, with the remaining LSRs presented through an innovative'language-free' way.
An international Oil and Gas operator required H2S safety solutions for their offshore drilling project to deal with up to 23% H2S. As the drilling location was near shore, a major challenge was protecting a community of approximately 50 homes and yards situated on the perimeter of the Emergency Awareness Zone. Preventing the potentially fatal consequences of an H2S release was of the utmost importance.
An Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of 3.1 kilometers was determined as a restricted zone only accessible for the operational personnel during the well test. Furthermore, an Emergency Awareness Zone (EAZ) of 4.3 kilometers was identified. Although the community is situated just outside of the EAZ, the project specific H2S Contingency Plan foresaw a notification of the local population in case of a release. In addition, information about potential H2S concentrations would be vital for emergency responders, such as police or civil defence.
A cutting-edge community protection solution was implemented, composed of gas and environmental monitors and wireless communicated H2S and SO2 sensors linked together to control the conditions within the EPZ and the EAZ. The system was capable of real time data stream to monitor online remotely. This allowed the operator to have instant tracking or reporting of the gas levels within the area. The operator was supplied with qualified and trained H2S safety personnel and an extensive training program was launched to ensure that all involved personnel are aware of the risks and necessary control and mitigation measures.
The customization and installation of a reliable, online perimeter-monitoring system allowed continuous data stream which made remote monitoring of the vicinity, based on both RF and web technology available for instant tracking and monitoring. Real-time information accessible from anywhere in the world allowed the operator to be aware and be prepared for any emergencies that might occur. SMS and email alerts were also programmed in case of any emergency to ensure a prompt response. Despite the difficult weather conditions at the shoreline (high humidity), the set-up worked very reliable with minimal false alarms. The system also provided a detailed data log for future analysis. Emergency responders felt assured by the degree of precaution implemented, knowing that they would be warned in a timely manner in the event of an emergency.
This case study presents an analysis of conventional and newer community protection systems and discusses in detail the significance of this innovation in dealing with rapidly expanding production near communities. It gets critical information on record and in real time, effectively reducing response times and helping the customer safeguard their assets, the community and emergency responders before, during, and after any event. The case study outlines how to make communities feel safe and how to conduct EPZ and EAZ monitoring efficiently using state-of-the-art technologies and customizing equipment to suit unique worksite requirements.
Oil & Gas industry, by nature of its operations, creates a hazardous working environment therefore over the years the industry has developed safe systems (procedural & design) to eliminate or minimise risks. Despite these initiatives often incidents occur resulting in serious injuries, release of gases, equipment damage and other losses. ADCO has established a comprehensive system to reduce both the number and severity of incidents as a part of its HSE Management System which was based on root causes of incidents and embedding learning into work planning. Since 2010, ADCO Drilling has increased its operations and activities significantly in terms of number of rigs, drilled wells and associated services. During the period approximately 500 incident events, including no work related, were recorded, resulting in injuries (300) of varying natures, vehicle (81), property damage (77) and releases of gas (12) & spillages (13) events. It resulted in 104 recordable injuries, 30 vehicle crashes and 10 well control events. Repetitive gap in the implementation of HSEMS required out of the box approach to embed the learning into drilling programme to reduce incidents.
Over 200 Drilling incident investigation root causes and findings were analysed and effectiveness of HSEMS implementation and identification of HSE performance risks were assessed. Gaps in identification of worksite/ job hazards, work planning, leadership, monitoring & inspection and communication accounted for 60% of root causes of incidents. In 2015, barrier analysis for incident event sub type basis was done considering root causes and associated findings and learning from the incident was mapped with barriers in conjunction with risk assessment. The scheme was implanted in 2016 and incident trends, root causes and findings are discussed in this paper. The strengthening of barriers was implemented and there reduction in number of incidents was noted despite increase in rig fleet and exposure to risks. Despite the scheme being in initial stages, it has showed significant potential in incident reduction.
Large development projects in certain parts of the world can positively or adversly affect Indigenous Peoples who hold specific rights for the protection of their cultures, traditional ways of life and special connections to lands and waters. Without proper engagement and cultural considerations, Indigenous Peoples may be alienated and marginalized from decision making resulting in fractured and difficult relations or a lost social license to operate. These vulnerabilities have given rise to the concept of Free Prior Informed Consent ('FPIC'), which is premised upon a prerequisite to engage in dialogue with local Indigenous communities and come to a joint agreement on the way forward in project implementation. Shell developed its FPIC position statement in 2016 which was made public April 2017 through the Shell Sustainability Report. Years before developing its position statement, Shell had already established various internal requirements for projects and assets to manage any potential impacts on Indigenous Peoples. However, in developing its public position statement, Shell saw this as an opportunity to strengthen the foundation for the practical implementation of FPIC. Shell's journey towards the adoption of FPIC provides useful insights for organisations interested in establishing policies aimed at Indigenous Peoples while taking into account the realities of practical, on-the-ground implementation. This paper focuses on the drivers for making the public statement; the process undertaken to develop it; the drivers for linking it to the International Finance Corporation's Performance Standards; and a summary of tools within Shell that help with the practical implementation of FPIC, notably the'Community Feedback Mechanism'; the Impact Assessment Process; and Agreement Making.
The Alpha Piper tragedy and the subsequent investigations led by Lord Cullen practically reshaped the offshore oil industry. How did the upstream oil industry change since? How did process safety legislation evolve across the world over these years? Is the upstream oil industry doing enough about process safety? If so, why are there still major accidents happening? Is there enough being done to address "Human Factors"? Is process safety legislation adequate in the various major oil producing regions around the world? Or does the development of process safety legislation remain largely in response to major accidents. After a brief review of the Alpha Piper disaster and its impact on the development of process safety legislations around the world, this paper attempts to answer the above questions.