This paper discusses the requisite engineering contractor capability for realizing the inclusion of the Engineering HSE requirements into the plant design. Engineering HSE is the terminology utilized by our company to describe technical safety, loss prevention, risk management and environmental requirements.
In addition, for the purpose of selecting a competent engineering contractor, the importance of evaluating the contractor Engineering HSE performance is discussed, which involves their awareness, understanding and behaviors required for incorporating the Engineering HSE requirements into the plant design.
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for the evaluation of the engineering contractor is described and it is proposed that a document outlining the KPI should be submitted by the engineering contractor at the bidding stage of FEED and EPC projects.
Our company has conducted over 20,000 projects in approximately 70 different countries all over the world. Our company's experience includes a wide range of Front End Engineering Design (FEED) and Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) projects in the fields of oil and gas development, petroleum refining, gas processing, and development of petrochemicals.
Responding to the growing demand for the implementation of a plant lifecycle HSE risk management program, our company as a partner for plant owners has reduced or mitigated the HSE risk during operation by incorporating Engineering HSE requirements into the plant design.
Our company has created the ability to define the Engineering HSE requirements in sufficient detail to allow incorporation of these requirements into the plant design at the onset of FEED and detail engineering. Our company also has the intimate knowledge of the correlation between the Engineering HSE requirements and the overall plant design, thereby ensuring a coordinated effort between all engineering disciplines.
This capability has been developed with a unique approach as presented in the SPE 9th international HSE conference [K. Tanigawa and K. Kobayashi, 2008]. In addition to this approach, the following activities have been conducted in order to enhance our company's performance as a competent engineering contractor:
• Engineering HSE meetings in the owner's office with their technical safety engineers or specialists for the purpose of sharing any challenges in projects, introducing our company's approach for the inclusion of Engineering HSE requirements and obtaining information such as any new trends concerning the Engineering HSE requirements
• Upgrade of HSE management system for projects in cooperation with our own project management team to execute our company's approach more efficiently in our projects
The oil and gas industry has reduced the fatal accident rate significantly over the last two decades, although in recent years this trend has slowed or stagnated, or in some cases fatalities have even increased. The reasons leading to many of these fatal incidents are not new. Incidents are often repeat events or events that are similar to previous incidents. So, the immediate question to ask is why have companies within the oil and gas industry, despite having investigated and communicated such events extensively, apparently not learned from past events?
This paper discusses and defines what learning means in the context of learning from a past event. It identifies the types of events companies must learn from, namely those with a higher probability of a catastrophic outcome. Having defined these first two points, the paper presents a method that meets the requirements of a learning process. Participants who attend such a learning session are taken through a three-step process, which engages them at different stages. The aim is to let the participants derive the solutions that would have prevented the incident—instead of giving them the outcome of the investigation and the associated lessons learned.
This paper presents a learning process that has been specifically designed to engage front line staff to gain a deeper understanding of lessons learned from past catastrophic or high potential events. The aim is to improve comprehension of what led to these events, to increase the memory retention of what would have prevented the catastrophic outcome, and to gain verbal agreement and commitment from the participants to apply the identified control measures needed to prevent a given event from happening again. This should ultimately lead to achieving further reductions in the fatal accident rate.
Multinational petrochemical corporations maintain occupational health programs that support their diverse operations around the globe. These programs have the potential to provide important observations and information to support international surveillance and response for emerging infectious diseases.
Incident investigation techniques in all high-hazard industries concentrate primarily on the immediate causes, such as the technical failures and the more frequent human shortcomings that led to the incident. Issues that are identified at these superficial levels of investigation and analysis tend to be local and hard to relate to deeper underlying causes that may be company-wide. Answers to more abstract questions, about organizational and cultural issues, provide much more useful information that organizations can use to implement preventative programs with far-reaching benefits rather than just treat symptoms of the underlying problem that may do little to prevent the next incident.
The ‘statistical' approach described in this paper relies upon the notion that lower accuracy of assignment to a cause category in any single accident analysis can be compensated by averaging over larger numbers of incidents. Investigators often remain close to the event because the evidence is more concrete and less ambiguous at the level of the immediate causes, resulting in a tendency to reinforce the idea that front-line operators are the primary causes of accidents - if only because no evidence is offered that there was a deeper-lying set of causes within the organization.
This paper describes a method for analyzing incidents that allows for the aggregation of multiple causes, taking different points of view, rather than being based upon an essentially linear approach such as event trees. The different categories chosen can be aligned with the organization's requirements for learning and improvement, as opposed to the primary aim of supplying an accurate description of what happened. The paper shows how it is possible to distinguish local from company-wide influences and demonstrate trends in underlying factors.
Incident investigation techniques in all high-hazard industries concentrate primarily on the immediate causes, such as the technical failures and the frequent human shortcomings that led to the incident. Issues that are identified at these superficial levels of investigation and analysis tend to be local and difficult to relate to deeper underlying causes that may be company-wide. For instance, a particular pump may have failed, leading to an automatic shut-down, or a high level alarm may have not registered, leading to an operator failing to take appropriate steps to prevent what became a disastrous release and fire. At the first level of analysis and learning we might decide to replace that pump, or type of pump, and often the operator may be disciplined for not giving sufficient attention to the levels in a process. These are answers to simple questions based on what happened, and who did, or failed to do, what? These answers may satisfy those who want to be seen to be taking immediate action, but they are of little use if we want to know why they were allowed to happen, about why the incident occurred and what interventions might be expected to have broader effects than those relating to the particulars of one incident. Answers to more abstract questions, about organizational, regulatory and cultural issues, provide much more useful information that organizations can use to implement preventative programs with far-reaching benefits rather than just treat symptoms of the underlying problem that may do little to prevent the next incident (Hudson 2010).
The Frequent Business Traveler (FBT) program was initiated in 2006 with the goals of: 1) assuring that FBT's have knowledge of the main health hazards during business travel, and 2) providing a risk based approach to medical screening before business travel which focuses resources on those at increased risk (Wendt 2008). Over 11,800 employees have participated in the program since 2006, including 91% completing the training module(s) and 84% completing the screening questionnaire.
In this paper, we are evaluating the FBT program along three components:
• Compliancy rate: determine if self-nomination sufficiently identifies the FBT population
• Fitness to work assessment: determine whether the screening questionnaire appropriately identifies those who should consult with a health provider before travel
• Program costs: compare the current model with the previous program model which utilized clinic exams for each traveler
Preliminary results indicate relatively poor agreement between the database of self-nominated FBT's and a database containing trip data from the Company's travel vendor. Additional ongoing analysis will evaluate whether travel agency data is a more accurate and complete means of identifying our FBT population
To date, 31% of those completing the screening questionnaire required review before travel, and 18% reported diagnoses recognized by IATA guidelines as potentially presenting a fitness to fly issue. Additional analysis is ongoing to evaluate average time spent on review and to assess how many more diagnoses represented a valid travel health issue.
Program costs (including resources for travelers requiring review, and pro-rated program maintenance/IT support) for 2006-2008 were estimated for a single site with approximately 670 FBT's. Costs of using the new system were estimated to be 6,862€, compared to an estimated 68,980€ over the same period of a program that included physical exams for all travelers.
Conclusion: The current FBT program represents a cost-efficient means of ensuring fitness to fly and adequate travel health for employees. However, it is recognized that identification of FBT's, knowledge assessment and even more targeted screening may be required to enhance the program.
Cardozo Feijó, Sirgiane V. (Repsol Brazil S.A) | Carvalho, Paulo Pereira (Repsol Services Co) | Rocha, Gustavo (Repsol Brasil S.A) | Lima, Gilson Brito Alves (Universidade Federal Fluminense) | de Souza, Jose Carlos (HSE & Quality Consultoria e Treinamento LTDA)
Due to the considerable time lost, resources and investments and negative environmental and health impacts, oil companies have developed techniques and methodologies for accidents prevention and analysis caused by unsafe behaviors in the work environments. The companies therefore are connecting its Integrated Management Systems to the Safety process focusing on the human behavior with the main objective of defining procedures to avoid accidents occurrence. The evaluated Company is implementing the Integrated Management System of its activities, based on the accidents prevention concept with focus on the human behavior. Following this direction this work presents an analysis of one of the evaluated Company corporate tools, adopted for the accidents prevention work and details its concepts and objectives. This tool has the main objective of making the workers understand the reason why they developed the unsafe behavior and allows that the professional reaches, together with the observer, the conclusion of which would be the safest way to perform the task, preserving his integrity and the others one'.
Key-Words: Preventive observations, Safety behaviour, Behaviour management.
The companies are more and more looking the results maximization, in way to join value for all their "stakeholders", seeking for the excellence in all of the areas that compose its business.
In this context, the companies that act in areas that involve high technological risks, as in the petroleum and gas segment, are more susceptible at the confront with difficulties in the success obtaining in this search, due to the accidents risks inherent to its activities.
The Ormen Lange gas processing facility at Nyhamna in Norway treats gas and condensate produced from the Ormen Lange gas field in the Norwegian Sea. Condensate is exported from the plant via tanker, while gas is exported via subsea pipeline to the UK where it fills 20% of UK natural gas needs. From the start, the intention was to build and operate a plant with minimal impact to the sensitive coastal environment in which it is located. With few exceptions, with respect to discharges and emissions, noise, light, emergency planning, risk management and environmental monitoring, the plant has operated from start-up well within compliance with the very detailed and demanding environmental requirements relative to any comparable facility in a highly regulated industry.
Subsea completed wells at a seawater depth of 850m produce to the plant onshore via a 120km pipeline. Slug catchers at the plant reduce the velocity of the flow and begin separation of gas, condensate and water. Further processing includes the reclaiming of mono-ethylene glycol, treatment to meet gas export specification, recompression of the gas to the export pipeline and transfer of the condensate to ships. Concurrent with operations, research and development of new technology to enhance production from the field is carried out at the onshore site.
The plant operates without the need for operation of the flare or pilot except under emergency conditions. Process water is treated in a bioreactor to meet strict discharge specifications in a populated, coastal area. Apart from the use of diesel to test emergency fire pumps and electricity from the hydro-electric powered national grid, the majority of the plant's energy needs are provided by heat generated by burning less than 0.5 percent of the incoming gas to the plant.
This paper describes the environmental standards governing operation of the Nyhamna plant and the challenges encountered in achieving compliance with these standards. These include technological challenges to measure, monitor and minimize discharges and emissions, studies on possible impacts on the varied marine and terrestrial environments and ongoing efforts to increase energy efficiency of plant operations.
Noise is one of the most prevalent workplace exposures in a wide variety of industries, and noise-induced hearing loss is one of the most common occupational illnesses globally. Despite legislative efforts such as the regulatory mandate enacted by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1983 to help prevent noise-induced hearing associated with workplace exposure, it remains a major problem with significant health implications. Although occupational noise is present in many industry sectors, it is estimated that 25% of the petroleum industry workforce may be exposed to levels beyond the OSHA permissible exposure level of 90 dB on an 8-hour time-weighted average.
Noise has been linked to adverse health effects involving different body systems, chiefly the cardiovascular and nervous systems. Several studies have also suggested a synergistic effect on hearing loss with combined exposures to a number of ototoxic agents including organic solvents. This paper reviews the current scientific knowledge and latest research developments on occupational hearing loss due to the interaction of noise and organic solvents, particularly as it relates to the petroleum industry. We will discuss the implications of these exposures on hearing conservation programs, present current best practices for hazard prevention and control measures, along with the latest guidance by international agencies in their efforts to mitigate the global burden of occupational noise. Since noise-induced hearing loss is not reversible, early detection and intervention is paramount in the prevention of this disorder.
Cumulative trauma disorders (CTDs) are estimated to account for $1 of every $3 spent of workers compensation costs. This accounts for more than $15 to $20 billion in direct costs such as medical bills. In addition to CTDs, computer users may also experience eyestrain, back pain and many other medical problems.
The increased prevalence of CTDs associated with video display terminals and the work environment has been well documented. The problem of CTDs continues to plague business as both a medical issue and performance issue. In the US alone, CTDs account for 5% of non-fatal injuries.
The relationship between computer usage and musculoskeletal complaints continues to be soft, while workers increasingly complain of pain and discomfort with computer usage. Physical and psychosocial work exposures have been shown to be risk factors for low-back pain and neck and upper limb symptoms, with CTS excluded (Aas et al. 2005; Bongers et al. 2006; van Rijn et al. 2009a, 2009b).
The program's experience indicated that over the past 5 years, the number of office-based worker ergonomic illnesses has been fairly constant with all workplace related injuries/illnesses reflecting a slight increase in the rate from ~3% to ~5%. The overall illness severity (measured in days away from work) has been consistent over this same period (~10% of workplace related office ergonomic illnesses resulted in days away form work). The data indicated the primary medial diagnosis for these musculoskeletal upper limb disorders included carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), tendonitis, and tenosynovitis. The body parts impacted by these
illnesses were hands/fingers approximately 65%, arms 25%, and shoulders/neck 01%. Many of these illnesses were experienced by our office based workers whose tasks includes frequent interface with computers and repetitive use of computer input devices.
A recent review of a major oil and gas company office ergonomic program prompted management to request the medical department assistance to review the corporate office ergonomic program to ensure office based activities are performed in a manner thereby reducing or eliminating stress, strain and injury /illness. An inter-professional team was assigned the task to implement the program. The objective of the program was to develop a template and toolkit to provide consistent criteria for additional intervention and a prioritized set of intervention options and guidelines to help supervisors and managers. The corporate process would define the requirements to ensure office safety and consistency in application.
This paper reports on the experience of implementing a worksite-based ergonomic program, the essential components of the program, and lessons learned for a more effective system-wide project approach.
Keywords: Cumulative Trauma Disorders, Musculoskeletal Disorders, Worksite, Ergonomics, Self Assessment Guide, Office Ergonomics (OE)
Velez, Peter (Shell International Exploration and Production Inc.) | Clark, James (ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company) | Lerch, William (ExxonMobil) | Johnsen, Hanne Grieff (Statoil Hydro) | Dickins, David (IPIECA) | Osikilo, Yvette
This review paper outlines past and upcoming activities undertaken by the oil industry on prevention and preparedness for oil spills on ice. It is envisaged that a best practice guidance document which clearly states the consensus view of the oil industry on this issue will be produced and disseminated in the near future.
In recent decades, there has been strong growth in exploration and production activities in ever more remote, environmentally sensitive and potentially challenging places, including the Arctic. The risk of oil spills perceived by the public in these areas is therefore heightened. There can be technical challenges and regulatory issues involved in the detection and recovery of oil in ice.
The oil industry actively promotes the prevention of spills in cold weather areas due to the difficulties associated with response, but the importance of readiness to respond to spills in these regions when possible is also recognised. Numerous projects are thus being undertaken by oil companies as well as other organisations either independently, through Joint Industry Projects or as part of an industry association to enhance spill response capabilities in remote and challenging regions.
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) have taken steps to address the issue by assembling a task force to coordinate the efforts of the oil industry in Arctic activities, including developing preparedness to respond in extreme weather conditions. The IPIECA Oil Spill Working Group (OSWG), working closely with the Industry Technical Advisory Committee (ITAC), is also assessing these issues and will help lead efforts to improve oil spill response capacity.
A joint committee comprising representatives from OGP, IPIECA, ITAC and other key partners will be formed in 2009 to review the work done by the oil industry on prevention and response to oil spills in ice, identify remaining gaps in industry preparedness, and prioritize identified issues.
This paper will contribute to knowledge in working in extreme environments.