Organisational resilience is a new concept in the safety mamangement literature. It has been defined as 'the characteristic of managing the organisation's activities to anticipate and circumvent threats to its existence and primary goals. This is shown in particular in an ability to manage severe pressures and conflicts between safety and the primary production or performance goals of the organisation' (Hale & Heijer, 2006, p31). This definition can be transposed from an organisational to a managerial level of analysis. The essence of managerial resilience being the ability to manage severe pressures and conflicts between safety and the primary performance goals of the organization (Flin, 2006). In order to achieve this, managers have to anticipate and either rebuff or circumvent threats to various goals, most notably to maximise production, while minimising the risks to safety. In some cases where this component of resilience fails - managers to not detect the threats; in others, the threats are recognised but the manager fails to take the requisite actions. So managerial resilience requires risk assessment, decision making and assertiveness skills. Production and safety goals can often be seen as competing, requiring the manager to make ‘trade-off' or ‘sacrificial' decisions. As Quinn (1988) points out, leadership is by its very nature inherently paradoxical and the most successful managers are those that can reconcile these paradoxes. In this paper, I first examine some notable organisational failures (the Swedish warship Vasa 1624; the space shuttles Challenger 1986 and Columbia 2003, and the oil platform Piper Alpha, 1988) where the erosion of managerial resilience appears to have played a key role, I then consider the key skill components of managerial resilience and how they might be measured and developed.
Vasa to Columbia
In 1625, the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus, was building an empire around the Baltic Sea, and to this end, ordered several new warships. Among them the Vasa which was to be built in Stockholm by a Dutch shipbuilder. His experience was essential as the Vasa was to be the mightiest warship in the world, armed with 64 guns on two gundecks. The finished battleship was a magnificient vessel with three tall masts and her wooden hull decorated with elaborate carvings of lions' heads, angels and mermaids. On Sunday August 10th 1628, she set sail from Stockholm on her maiden voyage, watched by a large crowd of spectators, including foreign diplomats. After a few minutes, she heeled over and sank to the bottom of Stockholm harbour . Of 150 people on board, fifty died in the disaster.
Analysis of the circumstances leading to the loss of Vasa (Borgenstam & Sandstrom, 1995; Ohrelius, 1962) revealed several weaknesses in organizational resilience. Treating the Vasa capsize as a new-product disaster, Kessler et al (2001) identified contributing causal factors, including:
Obsession with speed (productivity)
Top management meddling
Managers and safety professionals have historically relied upon a series of lagging or trailing indicators to measure safety performance. Indicators such as the recordable incident rate (RIR) or the Lost Work Case Rate (LWCR) have been used as the traditional ‘safety yardstick'. The inherent flaw in using such lagging indicators is well known; tracking failure is merely an exercise in reporting old news.
Focusing on the RIR or other lagging indictors also leads to other problems. Managers and safety professionals are often duped into believing that because they are experiencing a low RIR; their safety performance must be good or even improving. In fact, what often occurs may simply be a run of good luck or the ‘dilution effect' from aggregating hours worked by office staff and others with low risk profiles.
Safety professionals know that companies can raise the knowledge and awareness level of their workforce by performing inspections, audits, training, behavioral observations and other similar activities. These activities when performed, in turn, can help to lower the number of accidents. The question then becomes how does one develop performance indicators around such activities and encourage preemptive action. How does one shift the focus from the outcomes (i.e. RIR, LWCR) to the inputs?
Occidental of Elk Hills, Inc. (OEHI) has developed a Scorecard for Safety that encourages Contractors to perform activities that lead to better safety performance. By grading each Contractor's efforts in several key areas, focus and attention can be been brought to bear on performing activities that will help avoid accidents and incidents.
In fact, the actual number of OSHA recordables at Elk Hills dropped over 20% between 2002 and 2003 even though the activity level increased over 20%. Improving safety performance therefore is sometimes a simple matter of tracking the right "score??.
Several studies have been done to identify "best practices?? and their impact on safety performance as measured by the RIR. One such study performed by the Construction Industry Institute1 (CII) identified a series of factors that positively influenced the RIR on a number of major construction projects. In summary these "best practices?? were:
Demonstrated management commitment
Staffing for safety
Safety planning - pre-project / pre-task
Safety training and education
Worker involvement and participation
Recognition and rewards
Accident / incident reporting and investigation
Drug and alcohol testing
These "best practices?? were taken as a starting point for developing the metrics that underpin the Contractor Scorecard. While their impact on safety would appear to be intuitively correct, (the CII study confirmed as such) distilling these best practices into a meaningful and measurable "metric?? specific to the operation became a challenge. A number of variables needed to be considered (e.g. how does one define manage-ment commitment, how is it measured and how is data gathered and reported - let alone scored).
Parameter Selection and Criteria
Eventually several 'best practices‘ or parameters were agreed upon with operation personnel and included in the Scorecard. Some of these parameters were lagging, and some were leading. In several cases, new systems of data collection and analysis had to be developed and implemented. Ultimately, each of these parameters had specific activities or definitions associated with them and a numerical range of values assigned.
Chevron Corporation has created an Operational Excellence Management System that contains 46 Expectations that detail specific requirements for the management of safety, health, environment, reliability and efficiency. In order to meet these expectations, Chevron International Exploration and Production (CIEP) is standardizing all of its health, environment, safety, reliability and efficiency (HESRE) processes across all ten of its Strategic Business Units (SBUs).
CIEP formed a project team (Project Atlas) to develop and deploy standardized health, environment, and safety (HES) processes. A separate project was formed to deal with reliability and efficiency processes.
This paper describes the genesis of Project Atlas, the standardization process, the experiences and the results of the first round of processes to be standardized, and some of the challenges along the way. Aspects of the business case for standardization are detailed. The paper will also explore some of the issues and obstacles faced during implementation.
The paper describes a formal programme to assure the competence of engineers and operators working with explosives, radioactive sources and radiation generators.
The programme formalises minimum global competence standards for these safety critical operations and is aimed at ensuring that employees and contractors working with explosives and supervising operations involving radiation sources have the knowledge, skills, experience and personal qualities they need to work safely.
The paper discusses the development of competence standards which will deliver sustained improvements in health, safety and environmental performance. It describes the processes for assessment of a candidate's competence in the workplace and summarises the verification systems in place to ensure that assessment decisions are consistent and that finished portfolios are complete.
The issues which need to be considered when developing a programme of this type, and the problems to be overcome are identified and discussed.
"Working Together for Safety?? (SfS) was established in 2000 as a project trying to remedy an unfortunate situation of mistrust and scepticism between employer and employee organisations regarding safety in the industry.
This situation had gradually come about as a result of a perceived questionable commitment to safety in some companies and organisations.
The project was established as a tripartite co-operation between employer and employee organisations and with PSA (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway) as an active observer.
The background for the project was a very tough and difficult situation, characterised by mistrust and scepticism on both sides. Through a careful selection of processes and a common commitment to creating good personal relations and trust we have managed to create a unique climate for co-operation.
The Norwegian Parliament recognised SfS in 2002 to be the Forum for Best Practice in our industry in Norway, thus changing SfS from being a project to a more permanent forum.
Through identification of Best Practices we have managed to harmonize norms and procedures to reduce risk.
As an example we have managed to establish a common Permit to Work system and a common Station Bill, including a common emergency number and emergency signals. These have been made mandatory for petroleum activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
SfS was in 2005 awarded the Carolita U.Kallaur Award for Outstanding International Safety Leadership.
The paper describes the different processes by which we have achieved the agreement on common systems. Further, the paper contains a description of the process that resulted in the present working climate, which is characterised by very good personal relations and mutual trust.
During the last parts of 1990s the focus on safety was gradually weakened in the companies working on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Rationalisation and cost efficiency were high on the agenda. Gradually priorities changed while many managers involved perceived that they still were on a positive trend regarding safety performance. Most people thought that they could keep up the momentum on safety while at the same time focusing on cost and productivity.
Project work in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) on safety issues did not result in notable improvements any longer and we did not produce the safety results we expected.
The trend was in fact reversing, and instead of improvements we could see a negative trend in some companies.
The industry was accused of not taking safety seriously any longer. Employees expressed their concern in public, and the public at large was sceptical.
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) (NPD at that time) had for some time expressed their concern, not only based on statistics, but also on an objective review of the situation through their supervision of the industry.
A debate took place in the media on the topic of safety, outlining the theme "How safe is safe enough???. While management representatives from the industry claimed that safety standards had never been higher, unions, authorities, politicians and the general public were of the opinion that safety standards had deteriorated and that the safety statistics published did not give a true picture. The differences in opinions on the actual situation indicated clearly that stakeholders were far apart. The situation culminated when the Norwegian parliament requested a White Paper on safety.
This was a very serious situation for the industry's reputation. Something had to be done!
A co-operation between all stakeholders was necessary, but it was not obvious how to initiate this and how to co-operate.
Biodiversity conservation has risen rapidly up the environmental and political agenda and now represents one of the most important challenges of the 21st century. Oil and gas companies can contribute to international, national and local biodiversity conservation targets through careful planning and management of operations, working with stakeholders and partners to develop long-term and sustainable solutions.
However, companies face the challenge of how to integrate biodiversity considerations into their day-to-day activities. BAPs are a systematic approach to biodiversity conservation that can build on, and be integrated with, existing company activities and processes throughout the oil and gas project life cycle
This paper presents sector-specific guidance, developed by by the oil and gas industry, which will help the industry to develop BAPs for their sites and projects. It describes the principal process steps needed to develop a BAP. The paper highlights the conditions under which BAP may best be integrated in company's HSE management system or developed as a stand-alone product.
As stakeholder engagement is always at the basis of the development of a BAP, this paper also addresses the critical elements of that engagement process.
In simple terms biological diversity, or biodiversity, is the variability among living organisms from all sources, including terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems (UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 2). Biodiversity provides us with a host of raw materials, foods and medicines and forms the basis of the life support system of our planet by, for example, underpinning the continued availability of clean air and fresh water. Interwoven with these functional aspects are spiritual, cultural and recreational elements. These elements are more difficult to value, but in many countries and cultures they are considered to be at least as important as the more functional aspects of biodiversity.
The conservation of biodiversity is clearly important, both for the long-term and sustainable supply of raw materials and for the spiritual, cultural and recreational benefits that it brings. However, as the human population continues to grow, biodiversity is being lost at an increasing rate. Concern about this loss has prompted international, regional and national legislation, including the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which engendered the target to reduce the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010.
Biodiversity conservation and the private sector
The private sector, working with governments, NGOs, science and community partners, has a significant role to play in the conservation of biodiversity. Like many other sectors, the oil and gas industry faces the challenge of understanding what biodiversity conservation means in practical terms and how its day-to-day activities can be organised and managed to maximise the protection and enhancement of biodiversity. The Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) offers an opportunity to the oil and gas industry to achieve this integration at the local, activity-bound level.
A business case will clearly establish why preparing and implementing a BAP is mandatory or necessary: e.g. responding to legal or permitting requirements (see below), improving stakeholder relations and perceptions or avoiding costly mitigation actions later in the operation's life by incorporating effective constraints into the initial design process. It will also establish what benefits a BAP will bring to the company and to biodiversity conservation, and the likely consequences of not pursuing this approach.
Since May 2001 PETROBRAS is using spaceborne multi-sensor remote sensing for its sea surface monitoring program at the Campos, Santos and Espírito Santo Basins, southeastern Brazilian coast. Ocean color (SeaWiFS and MODIS), thermal infrared (NOAA/AVHRR), scatterometer (QuikSCAT) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (RADARSAT-1 and ENVISAT) data were integrated in order to detect and characterize different sorts of marine pollution and meteo-oceanographic phenomena. The near real time processing and delivery of the SAR data allowed the timely in-situ verification and sampling of the remotely detected events. Satellite sensors operating in the visible part of the spectrum are used to monitor ocean color variations and associated biomass changes. Thermal infrared radiometers are ideal to monitor features like oceanic fronts and upwelling plumes. However, the major limitation for both types of sensors is the extensive and persistent presence of clouds in the monitored area. Fortunately, microwave sensors such imaging spaceborne SAR permit the acquisition of oceanic scenes, regardless cloud coverage. With the spaceborne SAR systems available it is possible to have almost a daily synoptic view of large areas with suitable spatial resolution for the detection of different natural and men-made events. The integrated analysis of these dataset presents an important decision tool for emergencies, as well for the elaboration of contingency plans and evaluation of the oil industry activity impacts.
Offshore installations within the Arabian Gulf utilise a multi-ethnic workforce, many of who return to their native countries during their non-working time. Given the varied standards of health care among these countries concern was raised regarding the medical control of known conditions and the possibilities of contracting serious infections illnesses during leave periods. To investigate this a review of periodic medical examinations was undertaken.
Over 3 months the health data recorded on periodic medical examinations was transferred to a database (n=1037). This included height, weight, blood pressure, haematology, hepatitis profile (B/C), urinalyis, ECG, CXR, audiometry and spirometry. Existing medical conditions were assessed for control. The data was analysed using simple descriptive statistics.
The 1037 employees came from 48 different countries the most common being India (42.9%), Egypt (15.1%), Phillipines (7.3%) and Pakistan (4.8%). Their ages ranged from 19 to 64 with a mean age of 37.3. The mean BMI was 26 with 11.3% having a BMI of 30-35 and 1.5% having a BMI >35. 4.5% had raised blood pressure (systolic >140mmHg or diastolic >90mmHg). 4.5% had been previously diagnosed as hypertensive of whom 25.5% were suboptimally controlled. 3.2% had previously diagnosed type 2 diabetes 50% of whom were suboptimally controlled. 1% had previously undiagnosed diabetes detected at the medical. 1.4% had hepatitis B or C, the hepatitis C being predominant in Egyptians (87.5% of cases and 4.5% of Egyptians). 9.8% had NIHL and 1.2% had ECG abnormalities requiring follow up. No significant pathology was detected with CXR.
A significant proportion of diabetics and hypertensives were suboptimally controlled highlighting the prevalence of these conditions and the need to ensure appropriate medical follow up. The pattern of hepatitis C reflects the known high risk nations. The level of NIHL highlights the need for good hearing protection programmes.
Detection of health conditions at periodic medical surveillance in a multinational offshore workforce.
Though Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO) has been producing hydrocarbons for over 40 years without any major accident, the aging facilities; environmental restrictions and social obligations demand more than usual safety practices. The Shareholders, therefore, introduced some proactive measures in E&P Companies, in addition to traditional HSE activities, to ensure facilities' integrity. The development of ‘Integrity Assurance Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)' by ADMA-OPCO in late 2003 was envisaged by ADNOC to measure and ensure the effectiveness of the integrity assurance activities.
The paper demonstratess how the Integrity Assurance KPIs' instigate to systematically identify potential process safety / integrity incidents; assess their possible causes and be able to demonstrate that appropriate policies, prevention measures, safety systems procedures and emergency response systems are established. The paper establishes a synergy between HSE and Integrity.
In order to develop a renewed strategy for the emissions of greenhouse gases against internal and external commitments we have undertaken a number of steps
1) Full analyses of the data on energy consumption, venting and flaring for all of the operating units, which are currently in the baseline.
2) A forecast of the expected emissions based on a portfolio development, assuming certain CO2 or greenhouse gas emission intensities related to the type of oil and
or gas production.
3) An analysis of the option available to reduce, minimise or mitigate the greenhousegas emissions, with a focus on operational and design measures as well as captureand sequestration options. The work clearly revealed a shift in quality and accuracy of the data sets, with significant improvements over time. In addition the consensus on which substances contribute as greenhouse gas has changed as well, which impacts the reported GWP in CO2 equivalents. For example in the initial assessments VOC, SO2 and NOx were included and the factor for methane and halons have changed.
Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) has committed to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions following the Kyoto targets for developed countries. RDS accomplished the 2002 GHG emission target of 10% reduction relative to 1990. The contribution of the Exploration & Production (EP) part of RDS business to the total GHG emission is approximately 50%. The Kyoto target for GHG emission reduction in 2010 has been set at of 5% GHG emission reduction relative to the 1990 level.
Our ability to meet the RDS GHG emission 2010 target is partly based on our ability to implement the planned large associated gas gathering project in Nigeria, resulting in reduction and elimination of continuous flaring. In addition, the promotion of energy efficiency throughout RDS is expected to contribute to emission reduction or offset increased emissions from business growth. The elimination of continuous flaring is a long-standing RDS Minimum Environmental Standard (MES) requirement.
In 2004 we continued working to meet our voluntary GHG emissions target. We will need to actively manage these emissions to offset the rise in our CO2 releases that will occur as we use more energy to maintain production from ageing oil and natural gas fields, to refine heavier oils and to meet demand for lower sulphur petrol and diesel. Growth from new projects, such as the expansion of our Athabasca Oil Sands Project in Canada and the proposed Gas to Liquids plant in Qatar will also add to our emissions.
Improvements in energy efficiency will help, as we operate our refineries and chemicals plants better and complete Energise™ energy efficiency programmes at many of them. But the biggest reduction by far - a further 15 million tonnes of CO2 - will come from ending continuous flaring at oil production facilities, especially in Nigeria. Plans are in place to reduce our overall GHG emissions relative to production (http//: www.shell.com). We continue working to come as close as we can to meeting the government's and Shell's target to end continuous flaring of associated gas. This requires gathering and bringing to market gas from more than 1,000 oil wells. By the end of 2004, the joint venture had invested $2 billion and was gathering 33% of its associated gas. It expects to spend another $1.85 billion to capture the rest from increasingly remote or smaller wells. The effort is behind schedule, which means we expect to stop continuous flaring during 2009, as we complete construction of the final gas gathering facilities. The Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) ‘People and the Environment' report, available on the web, describes the programme to end continuous flaring in more detail.