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Abstract Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) are the equipment and systems that provide the foundation of risk management associated with Major Accident Hazards (MAHs). A SCE is classified as an equipment, structure or system whose failure could cause or contribute to a major accident, or the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident. Once the SCE has been ascertained, it is essential to describe its critical function in terms of a Performance Standard. Based on the Performance Standard, assurance tasks can be stated in the maintenance system to ensure that the required performance is confirmed. By analyzing the data in the maintenance system, confidence can be gained that all the SCEs required to manage Major Accidents and Environmental Hazards are functioning correctly. Alternatively, corrective actions can be taken to reinstate the integrity of the systems if shortcomings are identified. This paper shall detail out how the MAH and SCE Management process is initiated to follow the best industry practices in the identification and integrity management of major accident hazards as well as safety critical equipment. The tutorial shall describe in detail the following important stages:Identification of Major Accident Hazards Identification of Safety Critical Equipment, involved in managing Major Accident Hazards Define Performance Standards for these Safety Critical Equipment Execution of the Assurance processes that maintain or ensure the continued suitability of the SCE Equipment, and that these are meeting the Performance Standards Verification that all stages have been undertaken, any deviations being managed and thus that Major Accident Hazards are being controlled. Analyze and Improve Through the diligent application of these stages, it is possible to meet the requirements for MAH and SCE Management process giving a better understanding and control of risks in the industry.
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Abstract bp's Wells Organization manages its operational risks through what is known as the ‘Three Lines of Defense’ model. This is a three-tiered approach that starts with self-verification as the first line of defense which Wells assets apply to prevent or mitigate operational risks. The second line is conducted by its Safety and Operational Risk function using deep technical expertise. The third line of defense is provided by Group Audit. This paper will discuss the Wells self-verification programme evolution from its first implementation; results, lessons learned, and further steps planned as part of the continuous improvement cycle will be also shared. The company's Wells organization identified nine major accident risks which have the potential to result in significant HSE impacts. Examples include loss of well control, offshore vessel collision and dropped objects. The central Risk team developed bowties for these risks, with prevention barriers on cause legs and mitigation barriers on consequence legs. Detailed risk bowties are fundamental to Wells self-verification, adding technical depth to allow more focused verification to be performed when compared with the original bowties, as verification is now conducted using checklists targeting barriers at their component level – defined as critical tasks and equipment. Barriers are underpinned by barrier enablers – underlying supporting systems and processes such as control of work, safe operating limits, inspection and maintenance and others. Checklists are standardized and are available through a single, global digital application. This permits the verifiers, typically wellsite leaders, to conduct meaningful verification conversations, record the resulting actions, track them to closure within the application and gain a better understanding of any cumulative impacts, ineffective barriers and areas to focus on. Self-verification (SV) results are reviewed at rig, region, Wells and Upstream levels. Rigs and regions analyze barrier effectiveness and gaps and implement corrective actions with contractors at the rig or region level. Global insights are collated monthly and presented centrally to Wells leadership. Common themes and valuable learnings are then addressed at functional level, shared across the organization or escalated by the leadership. The self-verification programme at the barrier component level proved to be an effective risk management tool for the company's Wells organization. It helps to continuously identify risks, address gaps and learn from them. Recorded assessments not only provide the Wells organization with barrier performance data, but also highlight opportunities to improve. Leadership uses the results from barrier verification to gain a holistic view of how major accident risks are managed. Programme evolution has also eliminated duplicate reviews, improved clarity of barrier components, and improved sustainability through applying systematic approach, standardization, digitization and procedural discipline.
Key Takeaways Hiring companies routinely require prospective and established contractors to submit information to demonstrate their ability and likelihood of completing incident-free work. Challenges that undermine the contractor safety prequalification process are observable, however, including criteria selection, efficacy, variability and ignored criteria. This article discusses examples of nontraditional criteria that may have significant benefit for improved contractor safety prequalification. Great benefits can be realized by utilizing contractors rather than solely relying on internal resources to affect needed projects or tasks. Outsourcing allows an organization to reduce costs by maintaining a minimum workforce while allowing it to focus on its core business, promoting specialization within both the hiring and contracted company (Kozlovská & Struková, 2013; Yemenu & McCartin, 2010). Manu et al. (2013) specifically describe the benefits of contracting as including labor flexibility, transference of high-risk activities or financial risk, bargaining ability, and avoiding workers’ compensation costs. Contracting projects and services involves significant hazard and operational risk as well as benefit, however (Elliott, 2017).
Key Takeaways Management accountability for OSH performance is the foundation for management commitment. This article discusses what occupational health and safety management system (OHSMS) references can be used to design management accountability into OHSMS. Measuring the right part of the organization on the right things is essential for a culture of continual improvement. Apply a “balanced set of metrics” to strategic OSH objectives. Worker recognition is the foundation for worker involvement and participation. See examples of maturing worker participation to engagement, while enhancing recognition programs. With the 2018 publication of the ISO 45001 standard and the 2019 revision of the ANSI/ASSP Z10 standard, a marked increase has taken place in the use and improvement of occupational health and safety management systems (OHSMSs) among organizations throughout the U.S. and worldwide. Management systems are modeled after the Deming cycle of plan, do, check and act (PDCA). First published as a quality management system (ISO 9001:2008 and ISO 9001:2015), the environmental management system (ISO 14001:2004 and ISO 14001:2015) and occupational safety and health assessment series (OHSAS 18001) soon followed. ISO gained traction in 2018 when publishing its OHSMS standard as ISO 45001.
Summary bp’s (“the company’s”) wells organization manages its operational risks through what is known as the “three lines of defense” model. This is a three-tiered approach; the first line of defense is self-verification, which wells assets apply to prevent or mitigate operational risks. The second line of defense is conducted by the safety and operational risk function using deep technical expertise. The third line of defense is provided by group audit. In this paper, we discuss the wells self-verification program evolution from its first implementation and share case studies, results, impact, lessons learned, and further steps planned as part of the continuous improvement cycle. The company’s wells organization identified nine major accident risks that have the potential to result in significant health, safety, and environment (HSE) impacts. Examples include loss of well control (LoWC), offshore vessel collision, and dropped objects. The central risk team developed bowties for these risks, with prevention barriers on cause legs and mitigation barriers on consequence legs. Detailed risk bowties are fundamental to wells self-verification, adding technical depth to allow more focused verification to be performed when compared with the original bowties, because verification is now conducted using checklists targeting barriers at their component level, defined as critical tasks and equipment. Barriers are underpinned by barrier enablers (underlying supporting systems and processes) such as control of work, safe operating limits, inspection and maintenance, etc. Checklists are standardized and are available through a single, global digital application. This permits the verifiers, typically wellsite leaders, to conduct meaningful verification conversations, record the resulting actions, track them to closure within the application, and gain a better understanding of any cumulative impacts, ineffective barriers, and areas to focus on. Self-verification results are reviewed at rig, region, wells, and upstream levels. Rigs and regions analyze barrier effectiveness and gaps and implement corrective actions with contractors at the rig or region level. Global insights are collated monthly and presented centrally to wells leadership. Common themes and valuable learnings are then addressed at the functional level, shared across the organization, or escalated by the leadership. The self-verification program at the barrier component level proved to be an effective risk management tool for the company’s wells organization. It helps to continuously identify risks, address gaps, and learn from them. Recorded assessments not only provide the wells organization with barrier performance data but also highlight opportunities to improve. Leadership uses the results from barrier verification to gain a holistic view of how major accident risks are managed. Program evolution has also eliminated duplicate reviews, improved clarity of barrier components, and improved sustainability through applying a systematic approach, standardization, digitization, and procedural discipline.
In this article Rosneft Oil Company approaches to problems of industrial safety improvement are presented with application of risk management means. In Company since 2018 the project of health, safety and environmental (HSE) protection risks management has been executed. A common property of all modern production activities management systems of large companies is the element dedicated to risk management. HSE risk management process objective in Company is implementation and maintenance in terms of all the revealed hazards of proper and sufficient management measures, which correspond to the level of assessed risk, but also provided with necessary resources, distinguished on priority basis, and approved in Company on the corresponding management level. Basic selected process means are single risk matrix and risk analysis method “Bow tie diagram”. The implemented approaches to Company HSE risk management are innovative and advantageous due to their proactivity and structuredness. The condition and security of successful introduction of the process is engagement of Company employees at all levels. The experience of process introduction has demonstrated the efficiency of applied “Bow tie diagram” method, which apart from provision of the basic objectives achievement, presented opportunities of advanced key performance indicators formation, corresponding to self-monitoring, analysis and reporting technology criteria, based on assessment of preventive and responsive safety barriers. Moreover the process introduction experience presented the opportunity of improvement of incident investigation procedures and implementation of HSE risk-oriented control.
This is my third attempt to write this column and the second topic. As some of you know already, that led me to think about the human factors in risk mitigation and safety management and why we sometimes elect to take unnecessary risks. The forward has a great quote from Lord Cullen: "… It follows that the management of safety has to include assessing human factors and taking them into account. The implications of human factors for safety must be fully realized." In an IOGP article posted in 2017, he discussed human factors as a matter of life and death.
Key Takeaways Most organizations adopt a primary approach to designing and implementing their safety programs, typically either system or behavioral approaches. No single safety management approach seems to be entirely successful for understanding the causes of unsafe acts in the workplace in order to develop effective corrective and preventive actions. There are both advantages and disadvantages to using either safety management system or behavioral approaches. To better understand the causes of unsafe acts and perform appropriate corrective and preventive actions, a more comprehensive and integrated model based on system, behavioral and human performance approaches should be adopted. A recommended model is presented in this article. The human performance approach can act as a bridge for using both system and behavioral approaches for understanding the cause of unsafe acts in an organization. A review of the history of the safety field reveals an apparent tendency to change how safety is managed according to whatever approach is in vogue (e.g., regulatory-based safety, behavior-based safety, safety management systems, human performance). Each approach promises to be the cure-all for understanding the causes and elimination of unsafe acts leading to incidents. This also has led to many organizations adopting only a singular approach to managing their safety function and addressing unsafe acts and their impacts within a limited scope (Wachter & Yorio, 2014; 2018). This strategy has not likely been successful over the years. Although incident rates have decreased over the past century, the rates of severe and fatal incidents have remained fairly constant in recent years (BLS, 2019). The majority of incidents are still being attributed to human error as was true at the start of industrialization (Reason, 1990). For example, in industries such as rail transport and airlines, human error is the top cause of incidents (Koen, 2015). Approximately 80% of airplane incidents are due to human error (e.g., pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics), while 20% are due to equipment failures (Ranking, 2007). Human error has been implicated in 94% of motor vehicle crashes, due to violations and the presence of error precursors such as speeding, fatigue, and drunk or distracted driving (Brown, 2017).
One of the most important priorities and results of industrial safety is reduction of the number, and in marginal state total absence, of major incidents at production with grave negative effects first of all on human life and health, environment and, what is important, on business. For determination of priority measures with the purpose of industrial incidents prevention, the classification and analysis means have been applied for industrial incidents related to integrity damage of protective shell, so called Process Safety Events (PSE) and method of risk assessment and evaluation Bow Tie Diagram. As the baselines for analysis and research we used the results of PSE-1 and PSE-2 level incidents investigation which had taken place at the Rosneft’s hazardous production facility in 2019 and in 1st half year of 2020. The research was carried out in 2 stages. First one was an attribution of direct and system causes of PSE-1 and PSE-2 to preventive and responsive barriers (risk management measures) and determination of deficiencies barriers or omissions in which most frequently lead to production major incidents. Second stage was seasonal analysis of the most major incidents (PSE-1) and revealing the connection between the total number of incidents and the number of the most major incidents, classified as PSE-1. Results of the performed researches and calculations let us make several conclusions, having practical value. Target achievement of the major incidents reduction and diminishment of their consequences gravity is provided with the measures different from those directed to reduction of the total failure rate and increase of operational availability. Application of the barrier approach to the major incidents causes analysis, allowed us to determine priority measures, execution of which intentionally influences the frequency and gravity of production major incidents. It was established absence of any significant connection between the number of major incidents (PSE-1 and PSE-2) and their total quantity (PSE). The proposed assessment and evaluation methodology has potential for development in terms of development and application of more detailed “bow tie” diagrams applicable to the most frequently repeated types of incidents, as well as applicable to other types of incidents such as motor-vehicle, works at heights, electric safety etc.