With an estimated 152,000 jobs lost in the oilfield service sector since mid-2014 and the anticipated recovery of the industry in 2017-2018; is the industry ready for an interdependent culture between service companies and original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to reduce the bullwhip effect of rapid on boarding? The workforce of 2017 is much leaner and more specialized with both OEMs and service companies retaining the best and brightest. A rapid increase in rig count driven by higher oil prices will trigger hiring by both OEMs and service companies. What if each focused on where they deliver the most value: service companies in field operations and OEMs in building and maintaining the equipment?
Total recordable incident rate is a key driver in supplier selection and industry data shows the incident rate is directly correlated to years of service. Given a long enough time horizon, a zero-accident rate could be achieved across both equipment maintenance and field operations. What if service companies could focus on just field operations? Could zero be achieved faster? Could a more intimate relationship between the OEM and service company lower the overall cost of operations by reducing errors and extending the life of the equipment? Profit at the cost of safety and over hiring as demand for equipment and services increases will be key to the success of both OEMs and service companies. This paper will explore an alternative to "the way we always did it."
The three main aspects this paper will focus on are: Historical HSE statistics associated with boom and bust cycles, training for the next boom, and a new business model where OEMs take on a more proactive approach to the safety of the equipment they provide. We will explore the correlation of employees with less than twelve months of experience and accident rates, which has been observed during previous downturns. Competency on the maintenance of equipment is historically achieved through hands on learning: will the trained employees that were laid off return? The traditional teaching employed by OEMs will be explored and we will highlight that a better method is possible. And finally, a new business model that ties in all safety and training will be presented as we prepare for the next cycle.
The old adage that ‘You can’t manage, what you can’t measure’ is holds good today as well. Many Organizations are establishing SH&E management systems in line with international management systems to measure the performance, protect an organization’s assets, people and the environment. The use of performance standards, commonly known as metrics, has become an integral requirement of the SH&E management system aligning with main organizational goals. Lagging metrics such as accident, frequency & severity rates have dominated almost all Organizations as the key indicators of their SH&E performance since decades. These numbers and figures have been in wide use to represent an organization’s image in the SH&E arena. However, the advanced SH&E management systems have started to expand their attention to a few other leading indicators as well. This shift from an age old practice is primarily to be more proactive and effectively predict future SH&E issues. Leading and lagging metrics are used to verify whether the products, processes and systems that have been implemented to prevent or control losses that can impact the customers of the organization are effective and functioning as designed.
SH&E metrics must be integrated into all levels of the organization if SH&E aspects are to become an integral part of the business plan and operations. In many respects that management extends not only to the performance of the business in a safer way with the lack of accidents but also on the ‘productivity’ of the SH&E professionals employed by the Organizations. This requires SH&E professionals to integrate themselves at the highest levels of the Organizations to ensure that the SH&E initiatives are recognized and valued. Since each organization has various internal and external stakeholders, such as employees, visitors, contractors, shareholders, regulators, the public, suppliers, customers etc., the use of organization specific performance measurement metrics aligning with their organizational main goals will be specific depending on the nature of their organization. The need to develop and implement a comprehensive SH&E metrics program aligning with the organizational goals is a critical part of creating confidence in management and soliciting support for the programs. With the increasing move towards globalization, SH&E Professionals encounter a challenge of understanding of organization / country specific SH&E measurement metrics as they move from each type of industry across several countries.
Statoil has enhanced safety barrier management by introducing a structured methodology for evaluation and visualization of technical integrity for oil and gas production and processing plants. The methodology is described in the management system, and supported by guidelines and a computer-based system named Technical Integrity Management Portal (TIMP). Since 2011, the TIMP-methodology has been practiced on more than 40 sites (all offand onshore sites in Norway/Denmark). Technical condition is assessed and documented giving enhanced understanding of risk related to deficiencies that could influence HSE performance or production efficiency.
The paper describes the methodology and explains how it is used to decide upon technical condition and assess risk and mitigating actions. It will also describe how TIMP is used to support decision-making at various levels in the company in order to prioritize initiatives and budgeting. The plant engineers use it to support a structured analysis of technical issues related to equipment, systems and barrier functions. The operational management uses it for verifying control with operational risk related to technical degradations, and plant management uses it to support planning and budgeting.
The result of the effort has increased the understanding of barrier management since it takes into account a number of different issues such as system design, delayed or overdue maintenance, failure frequencies, deviations and incidents. TIMP has improved management of technical condition related to safety barriers and assessment of any weaknesses. Moreover the approach has made it easy to benchmark assets, and monitor performance over time. It also supports decision making related to life time extension of the assets. TIMP has improved focus and competence related to understanding and managing major accidental risk.
This approach combines the use of automatic indicators and other information generated from a variety of systems, and judgments made by professionals. The methodology promotes collaboration across disciplines.
Copyright 2013, Offshore Technology Conference This paper was prepared for presentation at the Offshore Technology Conference Brasil held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 29-31 October 2013. This paper was selected for presentation by an OTC program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper have not been reviewed by the Offshore Technology Conference and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material does not necessarily reflect any position of the Offshore Technology Conference, its officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the written consent of the Offshore Technology Conference is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of OTC copyright.
The Petroleum Safety Authorities Norway specifies in its regulations that enterprises must have a sound Health, Environment and Safety (HSE) culture. Different approaches are needed to obtain insight in the HSE culture.
This study were conducted in one of the large oil and gas companies in Norway to gain knowledge about factors that affected the HSE culture in the petroleum industry; both onshore and offshore. A special interest was organisational and working environment factors. The aim was to analyse the connections between what employees and managers say about HSE culture and what the company measures in objective HSE data.
Besides interviews to explore the important factors in the HSE culture concept, self-reported data from a company survey were used. It included demographic data and HSE climate items factorized into the factors "Perception of nearest manager??, "Confidence in management??, "HSE behaviour??, "Competence??, "Collaboration?? and "Procedures??. Health and safety performance data from 2004 was analyzed; sickness absence, recordable injuries, serious incidents and undesirable incidents. To study the relation between factors in the self-reported working condition survey and injuries summarized for 2000 to 2004, linear regression analyses were carried out. More than 3000 employees were included in the study.
We found that all the HSE climate factors were negatively associated with recordable injuries, but only the factor "Confidence in management?? was significantly negatively associated with recordable injuries. The conclusions were that working and organisational surveys might be used as indicators of risk of injuries. Management style and trust in the manager were important factors for personal injuries.
The study results give answer to the hypothesis that comparing and analysing data from different HSE measurement instruments might give a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses in the HSE culture.
The Norwegian Petroleum Industry
A large-scale petroleum industry has emerged in Norway in the course of the past three decades, following the discovery of oil deposits in the North Sea, with production start in 1971. Oil and gas production is currently Norway's largest industry, with both offshore and onshore operations. There are 52 Norwegian offshore oil-producing fields and 43 gas producing fields (Statistic Norway, 2007).
The oil installations related to the petroleum operations on the Norwegian continental shelf are located 40 to 185 miles from the coast. The crews are transported by helicopter to the offshore installations and the working period is normally 14 continuous days with 12-hour shifts, day or night, followed by a 4-week off period at home, the "2-4?? schedule.
Investigations following hydrocarbon leakages from Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) installations have focused almost exclusively on measures related to technical and mechanical causal factors, despite human and organizational failures being accepted as a significant underlying contributor to unwanted incidents.
The aim of this project was to examine recent large leakage incidents to look for common underlying causes relating to human and organizational factors and write appropriate recommendations based upon the findings. The project formed part of a larger Norwegian Oil Industry Association project to reduce hydrocarbon leakage incidents and subsequently improve HSE performance on the NCS.
Hydrocarbon leakage incidents from five offshore installations in the Statoil portfolio were assessed during a series of focus group workshops conducted with management and technical representatives from each installation, process specialists, and Human Factors specialists.
The incident reports and HTO (Human, Technology, Organization) annotated timeline diagrams were examined against at 14- point Human Factors keyword list adapted from the UK Health and Safety Executive's Major Hazards website.
Eighty one findings relating to the fourteen keywords plus twenty eight existing recommendations in the Synergi incident reporting and follow-up system were grouped into four themes for discussion at a follow-up plenary workshop; governing documentation for issuing permits to work, system understanding during abnormal situations, inspection & maintenance programs, and interaction between modification projects and the operational organization.
Based upon the discussion of these four themes, five recommendation topics were prepared; permits to work, land-based support during abnormal situations, understanding of technical systems and risk during abnormal situations, inspection and maintenance (tubing and fittings), and interaction between modification projects and the operational organization. Specific actions relating to each topic were then written for company duty holders for follow-up as part of a company integration process.
The keyword method revealed new findings, particularly relating to organizational deficiencies that had not been considered in the initial incident investigations. The methodology also gave operational management insight into how the Human Factors discipline contributes to incident investigation work.
1. Project Background and Introduction
A project to examine the risk level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) was initiated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in 2000 and has been continued by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority since 2004. The project focuses upon the risk to people, covering major incidents, accidents at work and working environment factors using both qualitative and quantitative risk indicators. Project findings have been used by the Norwegian petroleum industry as the basis for identifying areas critical to HSE, and subsequently as a basis for decision-making by both the industry and the state authorities on preventive safety and contingency planning.
Austria has produced oil for more than 60 years, typically from small and mature fields. Throughout the years a local safety culture developed which did not keep up with the developments in HSEQ in the international E&P industry.
After several years of below average safety performance (10 year LTI = 11) and continued poor results in 2004 (13 accidents with a lost time of 878 days recorded in OMV Austria E&P for the first 10 months of 2004) we were committed to change our performance. Because of this poor safety performance a leadership initiative was started in September 2004 to change the attitude towards safety of all employees and increase our understanding of the leadership drivers and responsibilities for HSEQ. Management was trained on basic HSEQ knowledge and a management system roll out initiative including reporting tools and training was undertaken. A HSEQ leadership workshop was introduced. This workshop focused on the leadership and management aspects of individual intention, behaviour, culture and systems. Safety leadership and loss prevention teams were established and monthly meetings scheduled. The training and tools given to the 780 employees were accepted by most of them and the attitude changed quickly. First half year of 2005 only one accident with 4 days lost time needed to be recorded and the number of near miss and hazard reports increased considerably. The leadership approach employed has been to change the way all people in the organization think about safety. We recognised that we needed to change the culture; how we related to HSEQ - we needed to work on the thinking behind the behaviour. This paper will show how an intensive focus on HSEQ leadership is able to, within a short period of time, change the safety performance of a company.
Aune, S. (Shell Exploration & Production) | Bryden, R. (Shell Exploration & Production) | Cairns, D. (Shell Exploration & Production) | Dam, P.V. (Shell Exploration & Production) | Dekker, G. (Shell Exploration & Production) | Lauvstad, B. (Shell Exploration & Production) | v.d. Wal, J. (Shell Exploration & Production)
This paper shows how previous work presentations at other SPE conferences, has been translated into significant improvements in safety performance within Shell EP's European operation.
The Assets within The Netherlands, Norway and The U.K. have all utilised similar approaches to bring about a positive shift in their safety culture and reduced injury rates. This has been achieved by creating greater personal accountability for the management of safety and by using different tools to diagnose and address specific safety challenges.
To increase personal responsibility and accountability for safety, the Assets have all used an approach that embeds the Hearts and Minds process Making Change Last1. This resulted in a top-down cascade from senior managers setting out their safety expectations through one-to-one conversations down the line in order to seek buy-in from all direct reports. This covered everyone, from the leadership teams to the sharp end of the organisation, resulting in everyone being "crystal clear" in what is expected of them and what their personal role is, in delivering the company's goal of no harm to people.
In combination with this drive on personal accountability, other proactive intervention tools have been used to generate a bottom-up "pull" within the organisations. This paper explains how this approach has been operationalised by three countries and sets out how they are moving forward together by pooling "best practises" to create even better performance.
In 1986 Shell International Exploration and Production started sponsoring a research programme to better understand why accidents occur and what can be done to avoid them. After 15 years of research involving the universities of Leiden, Manchester and Aberdeen it is time to take stock of the know-how that has been generated and analyse how this has changed life in Shell Companies. Both the theory and the practical tools to make the theory accessible for a wide audience are outlined in this paper.
The early contacts between Shell International and the psychological department of Leiden university stem from 1986. Soon thereafter Manchester university became involved and, in the nineties, Aberdeen university. Research initially focused on understanding the factors causing accidents and human behaviour. More recently the studies have shifted focus to human error and the violation of procedures, and methods to characterise and improve HSE culture. An essential part of the recent research has been concentrating on change processes to bringing about lasting HSE improvements.
Parallel to the research program, Shell Companies adopted a systematic approach to the management of safety, introducing the principles of Enhanced Safety Management in 1985. Following the Piper-A disaster and Lord Cullen's report, Safety Cases, and later on HSE Cases and HSE Management Systems were implemented in Shell Companies. For several years now Shell E&P companies have HSE management systems and cases in place with the environmental part certified to ISO 14001 standards.
A description of the results of the research on Human Behaviour, now referred to as the "Hearts and Minds" programme, has to be seen in the above context. The information given in this paper is not a chronological record of the last 15 years but an interpretation, with the benefit of hindsight, of the meaning of the research. Several of the concepts discussed have been presented in detail at previous SPE conferences1,2,3,4.
In the description of the various concepts it is necessary to have a good understanding of the basics of HSE management. Figure 1 provides a simple overview of the essential actions and conditions to manage HSE:
Understand the nature of the hazards in the work environment and the way in which these can escalate to something with undesirable consequences for people, environment, assets or reputation
Make sure that barriers are put in place, and kept in place in optimal condition to prevent a path opening up through the holes in the barriers (nothing is perfect in this world, so barriers can fail). The barriers can be hardware e.g. seatbelts in cars, pressure relief valves, firewater pumps etc. or procedural such as speed limits and weather limitations.