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Abstract In the event of offshore oilfield blow-out, real-time quantification of both spilled volume, recovered oil and environmental damage is essential. It is due to costly recovery and restoration process. In order to develop a robust and accurate quantification, we need to consider numerous parameters, which are sometimes tricky to be identified and captured. In this work, we present a new modeling technique under uncertainty, which accommodates numerous parameters and interaction among them. We begin the model by identifying possible parameters that contributes to the process: grouped into (1) subsurface, (2) surface and (3) operations. Subsurface e.g. well and reservoir characteristics. Surface e.g. ocean, wind, soil. (3) Operations e.g. oil spill treatment blow-out rate, oil characteristics, reservoir characteristics, ocean current speed, meteorological aspects, soil properties, and oil-spill treatment (oil booms and skimmers). We assign prior distribution for each parameter based on available data to capture the uncertainties. Before progressing to uncertainty propagation, we construct objective response (amount of recovered oil) through mass conservation equation in data-driven and non-intrusive way, using design of experiment and regression-based method. We propagate uncertainties using Monte Carlo simulation approach, where the result is presented in a distribution form, summarized by P10, P50, and P90 values. This work shows how to robustly calculate the amount of recovered oil under uncertainty in the event of offshore blow out. There are several notable challenges within the approach: 1) determining the uncertainty range in blow-out rate in case of rupture occurs in the well, 2) obtaining data for wind and ocean current speed since there is an interplay between local and global climate, and 3) accuracy of capturing the shoreline geometry. Despite the challenges, the results are in-line with the physics and several recorded blow-out cases. Define what is blow out rate (important as has highest sensitivity). Through sensitivity analysis with Sobol decomposition (define this …), we can define the heavy hitters. These heavy hitters give us knowledge on which parameters should be aware of. In real-time quantification, this analysis can provide an insight on what treatment method should be performed to efficiently recover the spill. We also highlight about the sufficiency of the model to obtain several parameters’ range, for example blow-out rate. The model should at least capture the physics in high details and incorporate multiple scenarios. In the case of blow-out rate, we extensively model the well completion and consider leaking due to unprecedented fractures or crater formation around the wellbore. We introduce a new framework of modeling to perform real-time quantification of offshore oil spills. This framework allows inferring the causality of the process and illustrating the risk level.
Abstract Blowouts have catastrophic consequences and can potentially occur during any exploration or development projects. The situations that could lead to a blowout are underestimated pore pressure, rapid change in pressure, abnormal pressure or operation complexities such as complete fluid loss and thief zones. Blowouts are the most destructive and dangerous disaster in the oil and gas operations. Apart from causing fatalities and injuries, a blowout also causes ecological and environmental damages. While there is remedial work that can be done to manage the side effect of a blowout, an analysis has to be done to evaluate the extent of the damage. The oil spill analysis has to include all parameters and take into consideration all scenarios which would cater for the remedial work needed to address the aftermath of the blowout. In this paper, the entire spill process beginning from the reservoir up to the surface is reviewed. The review covers the phenomenon involved in a spill process, the related HSE concerns, remedial work and spill modelling. The initial conditions, boundary conditions, and media transfer functions such as porous media properties, sand face and wellbore geometry are fully captured in the study and is reflected in the workflow. These parameters would affect the plume shape, size and geometry, blowout duration and oil spill volume estimation. The workflow presented in this paper is an effective technique for efficient decision making and remedial work in case of an oil spill resulting from an uncontrolled blowout.
This article, written by Special Publications Editor Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper IPTC 18215, “LULA Exercise: Testing the Oil-Spill Response to a Deep-Sea Blowout, With a Unique Combination of Surface and Subsea Response Techniques,” by C. Michel, L. Cazes, and C. Eygun, Total E&P Angola, and L. Page-Jones and J.-Y. Huet, OTRA, prepared for the 2014 International Petroleum Technology Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 10–12 December. The paper has not been peer reviewed.
To test the improved blowout-response capabilities implemented following the Deepwater Horizon accident, Total organized and ran a large exercise to check the ability to efficiently define, implement, and manage the response to a major oil spill resulting from a subsea blowout, including the mobilization of a new subsea-dispersant-injection (SSDI) device. After a year and a half of preparation, the exercise took place 13–15 November 2013.
The oil-spill-response exercise, codenamed LULA, considered a scenario in which a blowout at a water depth of 1,000 ft resulted in an uncontrolled release at 50,000 BOPD. The main objectives of the LULA exercise were
During the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the injection of dispersant directly at the source of the oil leakage at seafloor level proved to be an effective technique. The technique required the deployment of an SSDI system.
After the Deepwater Horizon accident, Total was involved with a group of nine major oil and gas companies in the Subsea Well Response Project. As a result of the work of this group, two SSDI kits were manufactured and positioned in Stavanger. Total wanted to test the ability to mobilize and deploy in a timely manner the newly developed equipment, and Total E&P Angola was designated as responsible for the organization of the LULA exercise in collaboration with the Ministry of Petroleum of Angola. The SSDI kit, positioned in Norway, would be transported by air to Angola, sent offshore, and deployed.
Abstract As climate change renders the Arctic increasingly accessible, there has been a substantial uptick in industry interest in the region; it is believed an estimated $100 billion could be invested in the Arctic over the next decade. The Arctic contains vast oil and natural gas reserves—the U.S. Geological Survey estimates the Arctic could contain 1,670 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil, or 30 percent of the world's undiscovered gas and 13 percent of oil. Energy companies are certain to be at the forefront of Arctic development and investment. Climate change has played an important role in expanding access to the Arctic region, although there have been fewer opportunities to access lower cost oil and gas plays. As conventional production has declined, industry has had to focus more on difficult-to-access and unconventional oil and gas plays throughout the world, including those in the Arctic. Exploration and development in the Arctic requires expensive, tailored technologies as well as safeguards adapted to the extreme climatic conditions. In the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, there have been additional costs associated with emergency response and containment requirements.
Cheng, Rongchao (CNPC Drilling Research Inst.) | Wang, Haige (CNPC Drilling Research Inst.) | Shi, Li (CNPC Drilling Research Inst.) | Ge, Yunhua (CNPC Drilling Research Inst.) | Sun, Zhengchun (CNPC Advisory Center) | Tian, Hongliang (CNPC Economics & Technology Research Inst.)
Abstract The Deepwater Horizon disaster is undoubtedly verified as the most severe and systematic failure within the oil and gas industry to date, leaving a lasting legacy with enormous human, economic and environmental consequences. In the wake of this tragedy, CNOOC, Sinopec and CNPC are triggered with joint efforts to upgrade safety rules for shallow and deep water drilling, so as to keep up with increasingly risky operations in an increasingly tough situation in China. Especially, there is a pressing need to rebuild integrated strategy and reshape the future of offshore play in South China Sea, the major and prospective deepwater area typically featuring in HPHT and lacking of matched drilling risk control technologies. Rigorous requirements are primarily analyzed with respect to present status of offshore drilling in China. All recorded oil spill incidents in GOM are statistically discussed to recognize controllable and uncontrollable reasons. Then, in view of the possible causes of the Deepwater Horizon accident, an integrated drilling risk management system was proposed with in-depth analysis in terms of six rules. The primary and fundamental rule is to improve offshore drilling technology, including pressure control, wellbore profile design and adjustment, casing running, cementing, risk prediction and treatment, as well as related equipments like BOP, ROV and riser. The second is to further modify offshore drilling standards, specifications and regulations. The third is to strengthen supervision and management from both national and corporate structures. The fourth is to cultivate and intensify the safety culture within the whole drilling system. The fifth, also the most urgent, is to establish allied emergency response system for blowout, explosion and oil spill. The last is about recruiting, training and talent introduction. The main purpose of this paper is to establish a specific drilling risk management system appropriate for offshore China to guarantee the energy security in the post-Macondo offshore play.
Abstract Poor supply chain management can set the conditions for failures of catastrophic proportions, both economically and in terms of safety. It has been the root cause of several of the largest disasters in oil and gas history. Many professionals fail to recognize important gaps due to the complexity of the web of supply relationships and the number of critical interfaces that can be misaligned. Professionals from executive offices, HSE, procurement, logistics, operations, and risk management need to take four major steps to ensure a safe supply chain: 1) Establish governance & organization to ensure organizational accountability for governance and management of supply chain risk, by appointing a supply chain czar and engaging crossfunctional stakeholders; 2) Adopt an internationally accepted top-level supply chain risk management framework and articulate first-level principles, including a policy on single sourcing; 3) Universally adopt formal "reinforcing" metrics and measurement systems, including measurement of supply chain risk, Total Cost methodologies, and quantification of the cost of supplier non-compliance; and 4) Extend supply chain strategy and policies to suppliers by scanning for suppliers that excel in HSE, setting supplier expectations and targets, training suppliers, and establishing mechanisms to hold them accountable including periodic audits.
Following the Macondo disaster, safety in our industry has been at the epicenter of many discussions and debates, and has been the subject of many articles in very diverse publications. I have attended a couple of related panel sessions at SPE meetings, and I have read the two very informative official reports (U.S. National Academy of Engineering and National Commission). After all of that, I would like to give you my personal thoughts on the subject of safety in our industry.
That 11 offshore workers lost their lives last April is without doubt an unforgettable tragedy. However, I believe that we can still say that, overall, our industry has had a fairly good safety record, especially if compared with other extractive industries. That being said, I believe that the safety standards in our industry are not adequately rigorous. I will illustrate with two examples:
First, last November, I attended a panel session at the IADC/SPE Asia Pacific Drilling Technology Conference. One panelist, from an operating company, explained that his company, when contracting a new rig, was checking the BOPs. In 50% of the cases, the BOP was not functioning according to specifications, which to me means they were malfunctioning. There are two possible explanations: either the specifications are relevant, and it is a mistake not to ensure the BOPs comply with them, or the specifications are inadequate, and it is acceptable not to fully comply; in that case, let’s change the specifications. Neither option is very rigorous.
Second, we all know of cases on our drilling rigs when the gas detection alarms have been deactivated because they frequently malfunction with false alarms (this was the case on the ill-fated Deepwater Horizon, but that did not play a role in the accident). This is clearly not a rigorous approach to safety. If these alarms are necessary, let’s make them work; if they are unnecessary, let’s remove them. Intentionally bypassing a security device does not communicate the safety standards we expect from our industry.
REPORT ON THE PETROLEUM-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD PETROLEUM CONGRESSES G. W. Govier, Chairman Task Force 2, Environmental Aflairs Committee At its May 1991 meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia the Executive Board established Task Force 2 under the Environmental Affairs Committee with the fol- lowing objectives: (i) (ii) (iii) To prepare an inventory of the environmental policies and practices of the WPC member coun- tries as related to certain of the more significant impact areas in the following sectors of the pet- roleum industry: - Exploration and drilling; - Development and production; - Transportation and storage of crude oil and - Processing and refining (excluding the petro- - Product handling and distribution. To collect and summarize assessments made by industry, government, universities, research establishments and others of the necessity for and the technical, economic and social effec- tiveness of the policies and practices. To present the findings to the Executive Board through the Environmental Affairs Committee. natural gas; chemical industry); Representatives from Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Norway, U.K. and Venezuela volunteered to serve on the Task Force with Dr. G. W. Govier of Canada named as Chairman. Names and addresses of the Members of the Task Force are given in Appendix 1. The Task Force was assisted by Corresponding Members also listed in Appendix 1. The Task Force agreed that the best way of carrying out its assignment was through two questionnaires, the first, Ql, designed to obtain the inventory of the environmental policies and the second, 42, designed to obtain assessments of the effectiveness of the poli- cies. Proceedings of the 14th World Petroleum Congress 0 1994 The Executive Board of the World Petroleum Congress Published by John Wiley & Sons Ql was designed to obtain summaries of the gov- ernment policies, as enunciated in legislation or regu- lations, and as they applied to the major ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AREAS encoun- tered in both UPSTREAM and DOWNSTREAM activities. Provision was made to distinguish between ONSHORE and OFFSHORE operations. The ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AREAS identified were the following: 1. CONTROL OF ESCAPE OF AND CLEAN-UP OF CRUDE OIL INCLUDING NGL OR OTHER LIQUID HYDROCARBONS (i.e. escape, leak or spill from any of well blowout, failure, test, workover, completion, recompletion, or abandonment ; equipment failure ; pipeline failure; storage tank failure; tank truck failure; etc.) 2. CONTROL OF ESCAPE OF NATURAL GAS INCLUDING LNG AND OTHER GASEOUS HYDROCARBONS (i.e. escape or leak from any of well blowout, failure, test, workover, com- pletion, recompletion, or abandonment; equipment failure; pipeline failure ; equipment or tank vent or stack discharge; storage vessel; product handling or distribution, etc.) 3. CONTROL OF ESCAPE OF HYDROGEN SULPHIDE AND OTHER NATURALLY OCCURRING SULPHUR COMPOUNDS
KUWAITI OIL WELLS BLOWOUT-ASPECTS AND EFFECTS Faisal Al-Jassim Deputy Managing Director, Operations, Kuwait Oil Company 1.
tory well was drilled at Bahrah field in 1936. During the period 1939 to 1943, eight wells were drilled at When the Iraqi troops were forced to leave Kuwait Burgan field, which confirmed earlier hopes of exten- by the allied forces after 40 days of war, they left sive production from the area. The first cargo of behind them the greatest oil catastrophe human crude oil was exported in June 1946. West and North beings have ever experienced. Fire plumes of tons of Kuwait fields were discovered during the 1950s. In gases of principal pollutants, hydrocarbons, soot, and 1974 a participation agreement was ratified by the associated metals were ejected up to a height of Kuwait National Assembly giving 60% control of the about 5 km. The retreating forces blew off about operations of KOC to the State of Kuwait. The 1200 wells all over Kuwaiti fields, including the Kuwaiti Government took over the remaining 40% Divided Zone (D.Z.). Of these 1200 wells, 614 are on of shares in March 1975. The total number of gath- fire*. Four firefighting companies were hired to start ering centres rose to 26 in 1985, with a total capacity work immediately after the liberation of Kuwait to of more than 2.5 MMSTB/D. control these wells. Three of these companies were On 2nd August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and oil from the U.S.A. and one from Canada. The number export was totally suspended. On 26th February of these companies steadily increased along with 1991 Kuwait was liberated. The first crude oil ship- logistical support. There are now 28 teams made up ment after liberation (1.9 MMSTB) took place on of private and multinational companies. 28th July 1991. This paper will concentrate on two main aspects. The first part will focus on the up-to-date engineer- 3. KUWAITI FIELDS ing aspects of bringing the blown-out wells under control, focusing on oil well fires and the difficulties Kuwaiti fields (Fig. 1) are scattered in different encountered, such as equipment availability, ord- parts of the country. Bahrah field was discovered nance clearance and logistical support. The paper during 1936 in North Kuwait. In February 1938 a then describes the procedures used to control the wild cat was drilled in Burgan field. Operations wells, and the steps taken to reach this aim are pre- resumed after the Second World War, in 1945. The sented. other fields in South East area, Magwa and Ahmadi, Finally the number of wells controlled, area-wise were also in operation during the 1951-1953 period. in different fields, with their original status, is also North Kuwait Oil fields Raudhatain and Sabriyah introduced. were discovered in 1955 and 1959 respectively. Umm The second part will concentrate on the environ- Gudair and Minagish in West Kuwait were dis- mental aspect, covering the impact of the plumes on covered during 1959. air quality, air pollution and