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The objective of this session is to raise awareness amongst Operational & HSE Leaders in the Caspian region on the way leadership shapes Safety Culture in the Oil and Gas industry. This session will explain what Safety Culture and Visible Safety Leadership means, and specifically describes the leadership characteristics that can influence Safety Culture. This session will give attendees an understanding and awareness that building and sustaining a positive Safety Culture is not a discreet event, but a journey. A manager’s style of leadership and visible demonstration of their commitment to safety, through actions, is important in shaping the organization’s culture. Improving Safety Culture requires determination and stamina.
The Health and Safety Executive's analysis shows poor hazard identification and risk analysis is a causal factor in 12 out of 14 recent major hydrocarbon releases, demonstrating that major accidents could be prevented if workers had a better understanding of major accident hazards (MAHs). Therefore, it is proposed that improving awareness of MAHs across the workforce, both onshore and offshore, would lead to better MAH management and a reduction in major accidents.
Once the domain of process engineers, major accident hazard management has been largely overlooked by much of industry. It was acknowledged as a problem but ignored in the hope that specialists had it under control.
Step Change in Safety's Major Accident Hazard Understanding workgroup responded to this by identifying different job roles (onshore and offshore), evaluating the resources to develop MAH understanding already available and creating a suite of resources to fill the gaps.
These resources include an e-learning tool for onshore (office-based) personnel, bowtie lunch and learn sessions, gap analysis tools to identify training requirements of offshore jobs, senior leaders' workshops and a MAH Awareness programme. The MAH Awareness programme, consisting of short films and presentations which can be customised to suit specific worksites and job roles. Each of the four packs explores different aspects of major accident management including MAH identification and analysis, bowties and safety and environmental critical elements, barrier maintenance, assurance and verification and the importance of taking responsibility of ‘owning’ your barrier.
Analysis of questionnaires completed before and after exposure to the programme demonstrates that knowledge of MAH management increased by approximately 30%. Additionally, the data demonstrates that elected safety representatives have a greater base knowledge of MAHs than the general offshore workforce, as do technical staff compared to non-technical and those employed by operators compared to contractor employees.
Whether this increased knowledge gained through taking part in the MAH Awareness programme is retained or impacts the number of major accidents has not yet been analysed but data such as the number of major accidents, including hydrocarbon releases, will be examined over forthcoming years to evaluate the effectiveness of the resources developed.
Defensive risk reduction models are typically reactive elements. These can be improved by adopting offensive strategies that are reaching outwards to gather critical data to inform on barrier performance, and enhance improvements in advance of the next potential unwanted event.
Practical techniques to add strategies of offense to defensive barrier risk reduction models are available, through the capabilities of bowtie barrier management. These can be fully capitalized with systems and software at an enterprise level. Specifically, an offensive approach uses the ability to combine risk, audit, incident and maintenance system or barrier-state data onto bowtie barriers for a fourfold view of barrier condition. This enables a more offensive stance: predictions of barrier decay or weakness, followed by improvement strategies and follow-up.
A critical four-corned risk and incident reduction strategy is presented: Risk: What are the major risks in our organisation and how are we managing them? Audits: Is each barrier in place and maintained as required? Incidents: Across one or several incidents, what barriers have been involved, and did they fail or perform as expected? Systems: What systems and system components are degraded or offline today and which barriers are therefore affected?
Risk: What are the major risks in our organisation and how are we managing them?
Audits: Is each barrier in place and maintained as required?
Incidents: Across one or several incidents, what barriers have been involved, and did they fail or perform as expected?
Systems: What systems and system components are degraded or offline today and which barriers are therefore affected?
Collation of this data can be performed by choosing a risk element that is common and available to all of the four elements – namely, a bowtie barrier. By using the visual aspects of a bowtie barrier to become the repository for all the relevant data, interpretation, indication and improvement is enhanced. Enterprise risk systems on suitable bowtie-based servers can bring all relevant data under one warehouse and improve access, consistency and shared risk reduction opportunities. Just as each barrier can become a hub for the capture and analysis of dynamic data, a server-based risk analysis warehouse for the enterprise promotes use of various forms of captured data for the scrutiny and improvement of barriers.
Worldwide in the last six years there has been a focus on performance based Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) as the foundational safety program of the oil and gas industry and regulatory systems. These SEMS systems promote the highest level of safety and are a key barrier to major incidents. Further they are continuous learning systems that are foundational to building a Safety Culture. They are not separate from business processes but are an integral part of them. This paper presents the USA experience and learnings from implementing SEMS post the Horizon incident. It was determined that the continuous learning in SEMS must be driven by data. This data came from performance audits but also other safety data. The barrier management process was found to be not only a key SEMS concept but also the best way to establish and measure safety performance indicators. The Center for Offshore Safety was established by the industry in the USA to determine the appropriate key performance indicators, collect them, analyze them, and develop SEMS best practices based on the data. This paper presents the learnings and concepts of an effective SEMS process in an organization as well as the safety learnings and best practices that have been developed including:
SEMS enhancement plans for the future will also be presented as well as key conclusions to date.
“Eye on Fatigue” is a unique approach for communicating a comprehensive fatigue risk management strategy (FRMS) to organizations. The model visually demonstrates the need for integrating organizational strategies and worker engagement to create a strong fatigue management safety culture. It further demonstrates the value of this approach by highlighting the financial drivers for implementing the strategy. This approach addresses fatigue as a complex issue that requires comprehensive strategies to fully mitigate. Most importantly, it recognizes the need for both management and workers to share responsibility in adequately managing the risks of fatigue.
This model addresses the fact that many organizations today still underestimate and underaddress existing fatigue risks. These organizations have achieved compliance, but not comprehensive and fully effective fatigue risk management. Many lack the capacity to formally identify fatigue risk exposures and lack the best practice knowledge needed to create mitigation strategies specifically targeted to known fatigue risks.
The Eye on Fatigue Model strives to communicate a more effective and systematic approach for managing fatigue. It incorporates the learnings from other fatigue strategies existing in North America and abroad, and is reflective of the key components of a generic safety management system. The model seeks to provide a more holistic framework for fatigue mitigation. This comprehensive strategy is based on the recognition that effective mitigation is reliant on organizational strategies inclusive of leadership support and embedded operational processes and procedures, as well as worker engagement strategies developed foundationally through education and awareness training.
These organizational and worker engagement strategies work synergistically in a comprehensive approach that, if implemented effectively, should demonstrate positive business drivers for the organization. The Eye on Fatigue Model uses the recognition of these business drivers to incentivize organizations toward controlling their fatigue-risk exposures. It does this by specifying the financial values that can align with comprehensive FRMS implementation. It uses common business language by detailing positive key performance indicators (KPIs) that may be influenced by the successful implementation of a FRMS program.
Yu, M. (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Texas AandM University) | Venkidasalapathy, J. A. (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Texas AandM University) | Shen, Y. (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Texas AandM University) | Quddus, N. (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Texas AandM University) | Mannan, S. M. (Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, Texas AandM University)
Deepwater drilling exploration takes place in cold, distant, and extremely high-pressure environments. It poses a great threat to human life and environment, and incurs higher cost of production than conventional drilling operations. To improve efficiency with increased production, offshore oil and gas industry introduced robotics technology in many underwater drilling and production operations. Implementation of robots also introduced complexity and added risks to the processes. The present study aims at identifying hazards and assessing risks associated with using underwater robots in offshore oil and gas production. Once potential scenarios caused by robotic failures are identified, consequences could be developed, and risk assessment could be done by traditional methods. The specific objectives of the current research are: to study robotics technologies used in offshore platforms primarily, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV); to understand their roles and limitations in oil and gas production; to study potential threats leading to underwater robot-robot collision or robot-structure collision; to evaluate all possible consequences due to collision; to recommend necessary safety barriers for identified threats.
In 2014, the US Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) approached SPE regarding a proposed collaboration opportunity to develop a voluntary industrywide near-miss data-sharing framework. The goal of this framework was envisioned as a resource to enhance the industry’s ability to capture and share key learnings from significant near-miss events with the objective of identifying and mitigating potential high-consequence risks. While the scope of this collaboration initially focused on only near misses, further discussion of the desired outcome resulted in increasing the scope to include a broader range of data that have learning value to help the industry to achieve improved safety performance. Further, in the spirit of continuous improvement, a related objective was identified to bring government and industry together to make a safe industry safer, and to enhance public confidence in the industry.
SPE and BSEE agreed to cochair a summit steering committee that included representatives from SPE, BSEE, exploration and production (E&P) operators, service companies, the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the Center for Offshore Safety, American Bureau of Shipping, and the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. During the planning process of the summit, it was agreed that the scope of a data collection and reporting framework would start with the US Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Additionally, a secondary objective was to consider how existing processes might be leveraged with an overarching objective to extend influence beyond the US OCS to align with other systems and requirements globally. In considering industry alternatives for developing a safety-data management framework, caution was advised to avoid creating an additional layer of reporting expectations over and above the current requirements by regulators and industry associations.
During the summit, Vice Admiral Brian Salerno, the director of BSEE, shared his perspective on the importance of industrywide safety-data collection and sharing. He also encouraged the E&P industry to demonstrate to the public how a safe industry could be made safer through more open data sharing.
Bow-tie approach was originally implemented for safety management system. The theory behind the bow-tie approach can be found in the Swiss cheese model by British psychologist James T. Reason (1990). The bow-tie has become popular as a structured method to assess risk where a qualitative approach is not possible or desirable. Bow-tie method can accommodate multiple outcomes and simultaneous multiple failure events. Bow-tie method avoids repeating the barrier analysis which is the old version of bow-tie method for multiple scenarios. In another word bow-tie method assimilates an accident scenario to a sequence of events, and barriers are mitigating the event results.
Although Bow-tie method has been used in many industries, it is an unknown technique in oil and gas. The features attributes to bow-tie diagram are mostly designed for failures which are not attributed to location as depth or timing as operation versus abandonment timing. Due to these down sides the failure management diagram (FMD) is suggested which handles these challenges with bow-tie diagram. In this method the incidents causing the well shut-in or regulatory actions is presented as incidents and failures which yield to these incidents such as buckled casing of micro-annulus in cement which is not treated as failure events and things which may cause these failure events are called hazards.
In this study the framework of FMD is presented for different well elements (i.e., casing, cement, and liner) during different stage of its life. Also the risk assessment analysis using fuzzy sets theory and Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) is discussed and results are discussed for different well elements.
In the oil and gas industry, the criticality of safety is at the heart of all projects and operations, as the direct and indirect costs of just one accident can be sufficient to make any of the major multinational companies insolvent. Safety management stands mainly on a tripod of human, technical and/or operational and organizational accident causation factors, with their safety management tools. Presently, the human and technical and/or operational factors have well-developed tools and models for preventing and mitigating their occurrence and impact, leaving the organizational factors without deployable models or tools.
To close this gap in industrial accident prevention and mitigation, an organizational reliability model is proposed to provide the diagnosis of organizational reliability states, complete with recommendations and improvement opportunities in the complex, high-risk, error-prone upstream sector of the offshore oil and gas industry.
This model applies two analytical paradigms; the HRO scales audit and template analysis, which are quantitative and qualitative methods respectively. Both approaches were used to assess the organizational reliability state of a multinational oil and gas company (High Reliability Organization – HRO) having offshore projects and operations in two operating regions; Norway and UK.
The template analysis involved running 25 interviews with stakeholders that met the model's sampling criteria, and coding the interview themes into the template of a-priori themes derived from reviewed HRO literature. The HRO scales audit survey was also run on a wider group of 60 respondents selected based on the same sampling criteria.
The weighted averages of codes on the final template were checked against the results of the HRO scales audit. The model's predictive validity was confirmed by the remarkably similar results from the qualitative and quantitative analyses, which clearly picked out fine details of the strengths and improvement opportunities in the HRO's safety management system. Sixteen (16) recommendations and improvement opportunities were provided from the model run.
This paper proposes the deployment of this model for meeting the identified safety management use cases in the oil and gas industry which includes the safety first priority, activity-based safety cost reduction, which is highly topical in lowering operating costs in the current global low oil price regimes, and for contractor and supply chain safety management.
Reflective or experiential learning has been an important development in the education of a number of professions. Progressing from the academic research carried out on the topic in the early 1980’s, it has become an integral part of professional training in medicine, nursing and teaching. Many of the traditional professions have a well-defined training route, including acquisition of the underpinning academic knowledge combined with supervised practice to develop the necessary skills to operate as an independent professional. Reflective learning forms a key part of this initial professional development, and the skills in becoming a “reflective practitioner” then endure throughout a career and are applied in continuous professional development.
Learning from your on-going professional practice is just as important as initial technical training. However, for those working in HSE as Practitioners and managers becoming a “reflective practitioner” may not have formed part of their initial development. Hence very few HSE Practitioners recognize the significance and power of using reflective learning tools, which denies them the opportunity to maximize the significant development opportunities from their own practice which would in turn make them better HSE Practitioners. Our own research among safety professionals suggested that formal reflection was not a concept they were familiar with, despite it being a requirement of the continuing professional development program of their professional membership body.
Since the 1990’s reflective papers have been a part of the assessment of many undergraduate and graduate degrees in UK Universities. Even where a reflective paper was not an assessment component in its own right, reflection on practice may form an element of other formal assessed assignments upon which the student’s final degree or grades depend. Evidence from research in higher education suggests that many students, particularly those international students from cultures where discussion with tutors is not the norm, struggle to understand what is required in reflective learning. However, many universities have developed techniques to assist in the process.