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Search accident: Permissions
...n Integral Solution Oriented to Efficient Risk Management in PEMEX's Facilities by Risky Activities Permissions Management Jose Gustavo Roa de la Fuente, and Daniel Armando Perez Armeria, UTCAM Copyright 2015,... printed in red paper) and Class B (low risk, and printed in blue paper). According to SPPTR, these permissions are stored, followed and managed in the workplace in an area called Permission Control Center (or C...ecurity in the facility. We obtained a solution which not only helps in the efficient management of permissions, it can even be a factor that prevents damage to facilities or equipment or environment or even, sa...
...ities. That's why PEMEX, since years ago, implemented a risky activities management system based on permissions. This system have been very helpful and sucessful to prevent incidents and accidents at their insta...lass B means all those activities with a lower risk such as sandblasting or airco maintenance. This permissions are in the form of printed documents, such as we can appreciate in the figure 2, the red printed pa...pers correspond to Class A permissions while the blues to Class B ...
...SPE-173400-MS 3 - How many permissions are right now in execution at the plant? - Which are the companies that are not doing a good use of... their permissions? - Is possible to get realtime data? - Acording the ...permissions data, how many people is working at this moment at the plant? - What companies are most active? - I...
Abstract Typical activities of the oil industry installations often involve risk situations that threaten the integrity of facilities, equipment, people or the environment. In this industry there have been many examples of incidents and accidents which unfortunately most of them with fatal consequences and all due to the lack of prevention in realization of activities which involving risk situations on the facilities. It is for this reason that Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) has implemented a Risky Activities Permission System (SPPTR for its acronym in spanish), which provides checks for the realization of activities on site through the classification of them in Class A (high risk, and printed in red paper) and Class B (low risk, and printed in blue paper). According to SPPTR, these permissions are stored, followed and managed in the workplace in an area called Permission Control Center (or CCP for its Spanish acronym). This project describes a solution based on ICT which support the management process of the Control Permission Center (CCP for its Spanish acronym). This solution allows you to track in detail the activities performed in the workplace indicating graphically in a plot plain the place in the facilities where are being performed these activities, the number of people involved, what company performs these activities, and if is necessary to perform other simultaneous activities, avoid simultaneous activities which involve some kind of risk, which contributes to strengthening security in the facility. We obtained a solution which not only helps in the efficient management of permissions, it can even be a factor that prevents damage to facilities or equipment or environment or even, save lives of workers. This paper explain this solution developed at Universidad Tecnológica de Campeche (UTCAM), which originally was focused to marine oil platforms, but could easily adapted for any kind of installation.
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > Mexico Government (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- Information Technology > Software (1.00)
- Information Technology > Communications (0.95)
...nstrated that in almost 60% of the cases accidents take place by precise nonfulfillment of the work permissions. Training and Implementation of Permit to Work Procedure has been considered by UNAS as a safety co...
...according to conformation of Data and Indicators of Safety, Accident Investigation, Accomplishment, Permissions of Work and Emergency Plans. Technical Integrity Mature fields operation must consider life extensi...
Abstract The Southern Argentina YPF Business Unit, UNAS, develops a wide Exploration and Production activity in more than twenty oilfields, dispersed in a vast area of twenty thousand square kilometers within the San Jorge Basin. The daily activity involves ten thousand workers under rigorous climatic conditions. The UNAS E&P operation is carried out in mature oil fields, some of them under continuous operation since 1907. In the last five years under a stage of changes in respect to a new prevailing social model, UNAS emphasized the need to improve its Safety Model, in order to deal with new and relevant elements of consideration: new government regulations, increasing number of union conflicts, social claims, and certain demands to increase workforce by poorly qualified personnel. Under this relevant context, UNAS defined and implemented a very challenging and solid model aiming to add value to the stakeholders by targeting a few critical elements of the Safety Culture. This paper provides a case of study of how the organization faces new opportunities of improving safety performance in a turbulent environment by means of accomplishment of a strong Health and Safety Policy and specific concrete actions. Introduction UNAS developed its new and challenging Safety Model based on the definition and application of a solid Health, Safety and Environment Corporate Policy based on four premises considered as key issues intended to reach safety culture as a sustainable value. The application of this model has been possible through the commitment and dedication of the whole management team, with a specific focus on "line responsibility", continuous risks assessment and transversal training programmes. The right application of new elements of technology has shown optimized results with respect to Coaching, Accidents Investigation, Risks Evaluations, Safety Observations, Communications and Analysis and Actions to mitigate Land Transportation Risk factors. I. Leadership and Permanent Safety Criteria UNAS safety precept considers the performance is dependent on leadership from top to bottom, accountability at departmental level and the commitment of strong management. Individuals also have to take a responsible behavior to their own safety performance in any work activity. Safety Leadership and Permanent Incorporation of Safety Criteria into all parts of business is assume to improve day by day the Safety Standards and to continue with the maintained reduction of the Total Injury Rate (TIR). One of the most important risk reduction strategies has been based on the generation of Proactive Mechanisms of Prevention. Proactive Safety Southern Argentina YPF has implemented a proactive management concept with the intention of anticipating risk situations, observing deflections and work hazards as well as reinforce good practices. According with this target, diffusion of Safety Alerts, presenting Accidents Investigation and massive Prevention Campaigns have been positively implemented.
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Safety > Operational safety (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > HSSE reporting (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > HSSE management systems (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > HSSE & Social Responsibility Management > Contingency planning and emergency response (1.00)
Subsea Blowout Source Control Technologies Utilized at the Macondo Accident and Developments in the Post-Macondo Era
Kutas, David Thomas (Chair of Drilling and Completion Engineering - Montanuniversitaet Leoben) | Bailey, Philip (Chair of Drilling and Completion Engineering - Montanuniversitaet Leoben) | Prohaska, Michael (Chair of Drilling and Completion Engineering - Montanuniversitaet Leoben)
...n as possible to regain the trust of the regulatory side, thus to be able to get back the necessary permissions to continue drilling in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. Development started mainly with the main interest ...
...n as possible to regain the trust of the regulatory side, thus to be able to get back the necessary permissions to continue drilling in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. From the practical side, development started mainl...
Abstract The publication generally and briefly describes what circumstances governed the petroleum industry and the connected regulatory organizations before the Macondo blowout. The paper shortly describes utilized classic containment and control efforts such as actuation attempts of the BOP, top kill with junk shot, relief wells. The publication's main focus is to describe and graphically present in detail the Cofferdam, the Riser Insertion Tube Tool, Top Hat, Capping Stack and choke and kill line collection method which were utilized to seal off the flow of hydrocarbons at the Macondo blowout. An extended literature review has been completed to fully cover and understand the technologies which were utilized and newly developed in the efforts to stop the outflow and abrogate the accident. The assessment of critical properties, problems are also presented next to the description of the specific source control technology. The blowout has triggered efforts never seen before both in short- and long-term not only from the side of affected regulatory and company side but industry wide. Short-term, the main effort was to contain the blowout as soon as possible, long-term it triggered strong determination from companies, and connected businesses to create proper contingency planning, containment technologies and strategies also through newly established consortiums. The non-profit oriented consortiums, containment systems and established HSE regulations need to be maintained properly even in a low oil price environment, so deeper understanding, recurrent inspection of the development ways of containment technologies in offshore environment can be crucial for sustaining the high HSE standards. The paper also aims to summarize knowledge to be able to make proper decisions in case of deepwater projects.
- Europe > Norway (0.46)
- North America > United States (0.30)
- Europe > United Kingdom (0.28)
... trailers Container offices Scaffold and tarpaulin shelters You should: Obtain suitable permissions and undertake appropriate risk assessment for any temporary building or workspace that is to be ins...
Abstract Most Oil and Gas Operators and service organizations have identified ‘Golden Rules’ intended to focus attention and influence safety behavior in their operations. Whilst these rules have successfully raised awareness of key safety hazards, the majority focus on occupational safety issues, such as lifting, confined space entry, electrical safety, etc, without explicitly addressing process safety or ‘major hazard’ issues. A recurrent theme from investigations into major accidents has been the recognition that occupational safety and process safety need to be treated differently. Concentrating on occupational safety metrics and controls will not necessarily positively influence process safety and environmental performance. Recognizing that Oil and Gas Operators undertake operations within a major accident hazard environment, a set of process safety behaviors is proposed that focus the attention of workforce and management on the actions, behaviors and attitudes that will help to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a major accident event (MAE/MATTE). These are based on such concepts as ‘maintaining a chronic sense of unease’ and ‘responding strongly to weak signals’; concepts which have emerged from recent major accidents - such as Texas City, Macondo and Buncefield. The opportunity exists to reconsider whether industry's focus is informed by an understanding of the broader operating risk portfolio. Effective engagement of key members of the operating organisation, both on and offshore in this key topic area is dependent upon its capacity to define and articulate risk management priorities. The competent, consistent and confident management of major accident hazards across the organisation is inextricably linked to this process. The inclusion of major accident priorities within focused campaigns and the explicit definition of mitigation responsibilities throughout the organisation could promote improvement in process safety performance. This approach will enhance the process safety performance of organisations, and provide a change in the perception of process safety.
...nal origin - language and culture); work leader's use of authority, supervisory style and oversight permissions; on the job communications and prescribed communication protocols; task coordination required; and ...
Abstract This paper addresses human performance risk mitigation strategies for incorporation into a Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS). A framework is provided that identifies human factors considerations and evaluation criteria needed for successful integration of Human Factors into a company's SEMS. A methodology is presented for assessing safety culture and the effectiveness of SEMS implementation. Results from employee surveys, taken across various high-risk industries, will be presented. The survey findings illustrate the common difficulties encountered in establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture and the challenges in achieving an effective SEMS. Successful integration of Human Factors in SEMS for the Oil and Gas Industry can reduce the risks of accidents and manmade disasters, such as the Macondo Well blowout. Integrating Human Factors into an SEMS might also improve operational efficiency and effectiveness, because Human Factors considers all levels of performance improvement, the individual worker, the work crew (team), and management. Optimum performance by all employees is necessary in order to attain a high level of organizational reliability. These are some components of Human Factors that contribute to improved safety performance and might help to prevent human error accidents and organizational failures: Clear specification of personnel qualification standards and required knowledge and skill competencies for both workers and supervisors. Utilization of advanced simulation training for individuals and teams. Improved collection, analysis, and display of safety critical well test, and other operational data, with better human – interface technology, improved operational procedures, and continuous technical training. Identifying critical Human Factors hazards and risk mitigation procedures for inclusion in the overall Safety Environment Management Systems. Safety training for line supervisors to include human performance and, communication and risk decision- making limitations and High Reliability Organization – HRO – Culture management principles. Routine assessment of Safety Climate and Culture based on HRO principles – to include valid metrics, benchmarking and desired norms. These factors are critical components for an effective SEMS - that if missing, or poorly implemented, can serve as the roots of accidents and manmade disasters like Macondo. They are also key areas of assessment that the author has used across industries to evaluate the strength of safety culture and to judge the effectiveness of a successful integration of Human Factors into a company's SEMS. This methodology and lessons learned from the application of these methods can and should be considered for use in the oil and gas industry for achieving a successful implementation of SEMS.
- Europe (1.00)
- North America > United States > Texas > Harris County > Houston (0.28)
- Health & Medicine > Consumer Health (1.00)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- Government > Military > Navy (0.93)
Abstract According to Brazil's Petroleum Law (Law No. 9.478/97), the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) must establish the technical and design requirements on Operational Safety to be accomplished by operators of concessions and inspect their marine facilities with respect to drilling and production of oil and natural gas. Considering this, was prepared the Technical Regulation of the Management System for Operational Safety on Marine Installations for Drilling and Production of Oil and Natural Gas, approved by Resolution ANP n°. 43/2007. Historical Accidents have taught that prescriptive regulations could discourage the creation, or delay the implementation, of new technologies in the field of safety engineering, since the natural tendency of the market, governed by the time and cost optimization, is to obey what was proposed and not overcome it. Therefore, the Technical Regulation of the Management System for Operational Safety applied by the ANP is composed of 17 Safety Management Practices that allow the operator of the concession to correlate them to their own guidelines for the management and safety technologies and methods that best meet each facility. This paper aims to explain how compliance with each practice of this regulation could have prevented the most likely causes of historical oil industry accidents. 1 - Introduction The first reading of the Technical Regulation of Operational Safety, approved by Resolution ANP n°. 43/2007, usually seems subjective or hard to understand. During ANP audits, the crew on board usually understand the meaning of each management practice of this regulation trough the auditors explanation on remarks made. Since not everyone has the opportunity to follow an audit or read their reports, this article attempts to clarify the understanding of the rules by the correlation of each management practice to an accident. Ouvir Ler foneticamente Dicionário1.advérbio 1.nevertheless 2.even so Historical accidents were chosen to figure this paper since they are known and disseminated globally. All the accidents here described are a sum of several errors. The objective of this paper is not to correlate each error to a lack of a management practice, but to pick at least one error that, if didn't occur, could avoid the accident or at least minimize its severity.
- South America > Brazil (1.00)
- North America > United States (1.00)
- Europe > United Kingdom (1.00)
- Asia > India > Maharashtra > Arabian Sea (0.45)
- South America > Brazil > Campos Basin (0.99)
- Oceania > Australia > Victoria > Bass Strait > Gippsland Basin (0.99)
- North America > United States > Texas > East Texas Salt Basin > Shell Field (0.99)
- (16 more...)
- Management (1.00)
- Health, Safety, Environment & Sustainability > Safety > Operational safety (1.00)