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Collaborating Authors
Atlantic Basin
Abstract EnerSea has advanced its design for the marine transport of compressed natural gas (CNG) through use of its proprietary technology, VOTRANSTM ("Volume Optimized Transport and Storage"). Over the past six years, EnerSea's design has been validated through completion of all testing required by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and project opportunities are now being progressed worldwide. E&P operators and many markets are increasingly expressing interest in transporting natural gas via CNG marine solutions. Demands from energy intensive markets for basic or supplemental supplies of clean fuel to drive their economies have inspired the creative application of new and existing technologies to unlock additional natural gas sources. CNG marine transport provides an innovative and cost effective solution for use in harvesting gas resources which are of insufficient quantities to justify LNG projects or are located beyond the economic reach of pipelines. Increases in the prices for crude oil and oil products over recent years have resulted in an immediate and negative economic impact on communities and consumers worldwide. Furthermore, while markets having access to multiple energy supply options have some measure for managing price volatility, energy-starved markets having limited means for procuring supplies are highly dependent on, and therefore much more vulnerable to, expensive fuel oil or diesel for their power generation and other energy needs. These "stranded markets", such as island countries, have been investigating the merits of LNG for many years to provide a long-term, affordable natural gas supply along with its environmental benefits compared to fuel oil. LNG's attractiveness has diminished significantly during the recent oil price escalation, as inflation within the industry has dramatically affected the costs of LNG projects and as global markets compete aggressively over limited supplies from severely delayed projects. Fortunately, CNG solutions offer a rational option for small-to-medium markets seeking more affordable gas supplies. This paper will describe the innovative VOTRANS CNG solution and the state of its readiness to meet the immediate energy needs of stranded markets worldwide. It will also present case reviews of two gas transport projects utilizing CNG marine transport solutions which are currently in preproject development planning. Introduction The precipitous increase in global energy prices over the past several years has created concern and economic distress amongst markets, governments and people worldwide. The resulting increases in fuel costs have taken a direct, immediate and negative economic toll on those communities and consumers. Markets with convenient access to multiple energy supply alternatives have more options for managing price volatility than isolated, energy-starved markets that are limited in their means for procuring supplies. These "stranded markets" are highly dependent on expensive imported fuel oil or diesel for their power generation and other energy needs, and they are more vulnerable to increases in their prices. Stranded markets, such as island countries, have been investigating for many years the potential for LNG to provide long-term, affordable natural gas supplies and environmental benefits compared to oil-based fuels. However, the perceived attractiveness of LNG has diminished as project costs have soared and as global markets compete aggressively over limited supplies from anticipated liquefaction projects experiencing protracted delays and cancellations.
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.89)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.89)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.89)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.89)
Abstract The evolution of the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita of sea state, ocean currents and water level in the northern Gulf of Mexico (GOM) is prescribed through the application of advanced numerical ocean response hindcast models. The wave hindcast utilizes a third-generation model that had been extensively validated against recent severe GOM hurricanes. For the present study a high resolution nested grid system (3 nm grid spacing basin-wide; 0.6 nm spacing in the coastal zone) is implemented. Currents and storm surge in shallow water are modeled with the ADCIRC community hydrodynamic model and mixed layer currents in deep water are modeled with a newly calibrated turbulence-closure current profile model. The wind fields in these hurricanes and especially in Katrina during the 24-hours before landfall, exhibited anomalous features that precluded the use of a simple wind modeling approach. Therefore, the wind fields used to drive the ocean response models were kinematically reanalyzed from all available in-situ, airborne and satellite data sources. The ocean response hindcasts were validated against all available measurements and generally exhibited good skill and negligible bias except at NOAA buoy 42040, which reported the highest significant wave height (16.9m), where the hindcast is about 10% lower than the measurement. These hindcasts were made to support the MMS sponsored program on post-mortem engineering studies; they are also of needed for the reassessment of design criteria. Introduction The purpose of this study is to develop a comprehensive, validated and reliable database of wind, sea state, and currents (vertically averaged in shallow water, mixed layer profile in deep water) associated with Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Rita (2005) in the Northern Gulf of Mexico (GOM) through the implementation and application of advanced hindcast models. This study is necessary because virtually no measurements of surface winds and ocean response were acquired at the locations of offshore industry platforms, drilling units and pipelines affected by the storm. Reliable estimates of peak conditions experienced at such locations are needed for engineering studies of failure modes as well as for the reassessment of design criteria. The models adopted have been previously applied and validated against historical GOM hurricanes and are also validated against the scant measured data acquired offshore in these two hurricanes at the locations of NOAA moored data buoys. This study is analogous to comprehensive studies that we have performed of Hurricane Andrew (1992) carried out in 1993-1994 (1), Hurricane Lili (2) and Hurricane Ivan (3). The hindcast database is intended to satisfy the needs for wind, wave and current data for participants of the MMS (Minerals Management Service) program launched to assess the impact of Katrina and Rita on the offshore infrastructure. The hindcast methodology applied in this study builds upon methods that have continuously evolved over the past 35 years to measure, describe, understand and model the surface marine meteorological characteristics of GOM hurricanes and the corresponding ocean response to their passage (4, 5, 6, and 7).
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (1.00)
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
Abstract The deep and ultra-deep water petroleum potential of the Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) is poorly documented in the literature. Only nine wells were drilled in water deeper than 500 m and only one well has been drilled as an ultradeep, >2000 m, test. However, the available seismic data shows that numerous large structural and stratigraphic traps are located on the slope and rise of the network of interconnected Mesozoic-aged rift basins, situated on the passive margin surrounding the NL continental shelf. Introduction Deepwater exploration plays in Atlantic Canada extend from the Georges Bank's slope in southern Nova Scotia, through the Scotian and Grand Banks slopes, through the Flemish Pass and into Orphan and Hopedale basins in the north (Figure 1). All these basins are situated in a divergent margin setting, similar to the Brazilian or Angolan basin margins. Until recently, the Laurentian Basin found between the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and the French Territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon remained unexplored due to a long jurisdictional moratorium. The basin contains an impressive thickness of Jurassic to Tertiary-aged sediments, including source and reservoir rocks and remains undrilled in the Canadian jurisdiction. Two deep water basins located north-east of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland in an intra-continental setting are the Flemish Pass and East Orphan basins. A 2003 well in the Flemish Pass Basin - Mizzen L-11 - has proven the existence of rich Kimmeridgian-aged source rocks and had a 5 m of net oil pay in Late Jurassic sandstone ("Baccalieu" sandstone) reservoirs equivalent to the Jeanne d'Arc Formation in the Jeanne d'Arc Basin. The East Orphan Basin contains an impressive number of large undrilled structures, has seismic sequences that correlate to the Kimmeridgian source rocks in the adjacent basins and is in a midst of an exploration effort by Chevron Canada and its partners. A first well in the basin, the Great Barasway F-66 was drilled during the 2006 fall/winter and was rig released on winter 2007 with a total depth drilled of 7404m but its results remain confidential. The West Orphan Basin has seen drilling only on bold or thinly covered basement blocks and may have Cretaceous mature source rocks within deeper grabens. Figure 1. Location of deepwater basins offshore NL and of the representative deepwater wells Great Barasway F-66, Mizzen L-11 and ODP Leg 210 holes. (available in full paper) Additional deepwater petroleum potential exists in the Hopedale Basin, of Labrador Sea where recent 2D seismic data shows that deep synrift depocenters and thick sedimentary cover continue into the deepwater, where structural and stratigraphic traps are abundant and an oil play may be present. Regional Geology The Newfoundland and Labrador margin developed during the Mesozoic break-up of Pangaea and opening of the North Atlantic Ocean (Enachescu, 1987 and 1988; Tankard and Welsink, 1987; Sinclair, 1988; Grant and McAlpine, 1990; McAlpine, 1990; Enachescu and Dunning, 1994; Enachescu et al., 2005c). Extensional structures and salt diapirism containing thick syn rift and thermal subsidence sedimentary fill characterizes the basins and sub-basins formed along the margin (Atkinson and Fagan, 2000; Hogg and Enachescu, 2001; Enachescu and Fagan, 2005; Enachescu and Hogg, 2005).
- Phanerozoic > Cenozoic > Tertiary (1.00)
- Phanerozoic > Mesozoic > Cretaceous > Upper Cretaceous (0.49)
- Phanerozoic > Mesozoic > Jurassic > Upper Jurassic > Kimmeridgian (0.45)
- Geology > Structural Geology > Tectonics (1.00)
- Geology > Sedimentary Basin (1.00)
- Geology > Rock Type > Sedimentary Rock > Clastic Rock > Sandstone (1.00)
- Geology > Geological Subdiscipline > Economic Geology > Petroleum Geology (1.00)
- North America > Canada > Newfoundland and Labrador > Newfoundland > North Atlantic Ocean > Atlantic Margin Basin > Scotian Basin > Laurentian Basin (0.99)
- North America > Canada > Newfoundland and Labrador > Newfoundland > North Atlantic Ocean > Atlantic Margin Basin > Grand Banks Basin > Orphan Basin (0.99)
- North America > Canada > Newfoundland and Labrador > Newfoundland > North Atlantic Ocean > Atlantic Margin Basin > Grand Banks Basin > Jeanne d'Arc Basin > White Rose Field > Avalon Formation (0.99)
- (23 more...)
Abstract Numerous offshore LNG projects have been proposed over recent years and many have included concrete gravity based caisson solutions to meet functional requirements such as breakwater protection, secondary containment structures for LNG storage and topside liquefaction or regasification facilities support. Those functional requirements are examined and caisson arrangements and solutions that meet all, or only some of the requirements, are reviewed as are the LNG storage technologies appropriate to offshore gravity based LNG storage. It is shown that project developers can elect to reduce the caisson functional requirements with a corresponding reduction in material quantities but also simplify project execution plan by separating disparate construction demands. It is concluded that the simplest caisson and storage arrangement in terms of construction cost and execution is the cylindrical form of substructure and tankage. Such an arrangement can be implemented using existing contracting partnerships and allows topside fabrication to be undertaken at specialist offshore fabrication facilities. Introduction The last five years has seen a number of offshore concrete liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals proposed for development yet only one has moved to construction in the current round of projects expected to be completed by 2010. No doubt the delay is in a large part due to the relative scarcity of LNG in the Atlantic Basin in particular and less than expected increases in the price of natural gas in North America. Significantly, US onshore developments have been shown to be easier to site and permit and less costly than their offshore alternatives. This, perhaps, should not be that surprising given the relatively undeveloped Gulf of Mexico coastline and the difficulties that arose during offshore permitting. The next round of LNG terminals could well be more difficult to site so the focus could shift back offshore. In that event the offshore LNG industry needs to be clearer on its approach to the development of offshore LNG projects to make them cost and schedule effective. Concrete caissons have long been associated with offshore LNG projects. The LNG development phase in the 1970's included at least one scheme for a short piled surface piercing caisson supporting a cylindrical LNG storage tank. The most recent offshore LNG development work has included cylindrical and rectangular caissons with one of four different storage technologies. The design requirements for offshore caissons have ranged from a minimalist storage requirement to the requirement for both topside facilities support and breakwater action. With such differing design demands, the solution must and should be quite different and perhaps the concept development and procurement approach should also differ. This paper will review a wide range of possible concrete gravity substructure solutions for a number of project criteria. The paper will quantitatively describe best practice solutions for LNG storage using 9% Nickel, membrane, prismatic and concrete storage. Ranges of application for each scheme will be prepared as will outline execution plans and cost estimates.
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
Abstract As developers race around the globe building liquefied natural gas ("LNG") terminals, companies acquiring capacity at those terminals are analyzing their reliability and operability and how to manage the risks associated with synchronizing shipping schedules with terminal access rights and downstream sales commitments. This paper describes a riskbased, analytical approach that has been applied to achieve this in several North American LNG terminals. This analysis is particularly keen at terminals where there are multiple shippers. Utilizing Monte Carlo simulation techniques, the approach incorporates terminal-specific reliability and operational factors, including contractual, regulatory and waterway constraints, to predict LNG terminal performance in terms of operability. "Operability" is a term that describes how efficient a terminal is at transferring LNG from the tankers through the terminal. Specifically, the analysis evaluates a terminal's ability to meet contractual supply agreements given constraints such as:Customer demands, LNG inventory capacity designated to each shipper, LNG vessel delivery schedules, LNG vessel sizes, Number of berths, Marine operating hours, and Terminal capacity. The analysis quantifies the impact on performance of factors such as vessel delays due to transport issues en route, berthing delays due to adverse conditions at the destination port, equipment reliability that limits terminal throughput, constraints in storage capacity, inventory management to prevent bottom-outs and top-outs of tanks, effects of gas cavern storage and "peaking" operations to compensate for prior shortfalls. Armed with these quantitative insights, marketing teams can then identify "deal breaker" issues and craft strategies for negotiating LNG sales and purchase agreements and LNG terminal use agreements while minimizing demurrage. Of particular value to marketing and shipping operations teams, this paper will further explain how, at multi-shipper terminals, the ability to compare terminal performance envelopes for a virtual single-shipper terminal with a balkanized, multi-shipper terminal quantifies the value of vessel scheduling and other operational coordination among the shippers. This analysis will help to ensure that terminals do not enter into commercial agreements beyond the capabilities of the terminal and hence incur heavy penalties for shortfalls in performance. Negotiating Access Rights The recent urgency for multi-user coordination at a regasification terminal reflects the commercial and regulatory imperatives in the modern LNG markets. While historically the LNG industry was structured as a longterm, point-to-point system with surplus, dedicated shipping and ample LNG storage capacity, today's global industry, notably in the Atlantic basin, is characterized by multiple supply sources, leaner shipping pools, destination flexibility and multiple users sharing capacity at LNG receiving terminals. The current markets pose challenges for terminal users as they seek to synchronize contractual commitments with operational realities to meet commercial objectives and efficient terminal utilization. The most significant issues at LNG terminals with multiple users are the allocation of unloading windows among users, including the initial assignments and subsequent modifications; sharing of storage capacity and send-out rights; borrowing and lending of LNG molecules; and gas quality coordination.
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
Abstract Accurate prediction of damage to petroleum production infrastructure from hurricane winds, waves, and storm surges has numerous applications to facility design, production planning, and the financial markets, among others. Here we describe a system for the estimation of damage, repair time, and shut in production using a numerical hurricane model and damage models for various infrastructure components. The system was designed and pilot-tested using data from Hurricane Ivan (2004) and prior storms, and validated operationally in forecast mode during the 2005 hurricane season. The petroleum extraction and distribution systems in the Gulf of Mexico as of 1 May 2005 were stored in a geographic information system. Damage to that infrastructure, consisting of over 50,000 elements, was computed using a three-dimensional physics hurricane model driven by forecast track and intensity data. The resulting damage statistics were then used to derive shut in production predictions for the Katrina and Rita landfalls, the results of which were posted on a web site in real time. The performance of the real time forecast system has been compared to reported statistics and found to accurately predict shut in production, especially using 24 hour forecasts through immediate post storm meteorological data. The validated shut in production prediction model was then applied using the 155 years of existing historical data to produce estimates of the magnitude and frequency with which significant production disruption would have been expected from the Gulf of Mexico facilities, given the present distribution of platforms and on-shore facilities. These frequencies indicate that significant disruptions of production on the order of magnitude seen in 2005 would be relatively common occurrences, given the performance of the infrastructure in recent events and historical hurricane activity. This implies that both design criteria and management of the petroleum production and distribution infrastructure should be revised. 1. Introduction Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 dramatized the vulnerability of the oil and gas production and refining infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) and adjacent coastal areas. While a few previous storms, notably Hurricane Ivan, also caused significant disruption to production, the period of development of the GoM and especially the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) fields coincided with a lull in intense storms1. While the cause of this lull is a subject of debate (see Goldenberger2 and Emanuel3,4 for example), the net effect is that the GoM petroleum extraction and processing infrastructure has not experienced a sustained period of frequent and intense hurricane activity until very recently. Estimating the frequency and magnitude of production disruptions from hurricanes is a complex problem, involving climatology and meteorology, engineering, and statistics. One approach, taken by Kaiser and Pulsipher5, is to analyze recent production history and apply simple regression models to the relatively short production record in an attempt to predict production impacts. Here we present a fundamentally different approach using a physics based computer simulation of every hurricane since 1851 and engineering models of oil and gas infrastructure. While Kaiser and Pulsipher concluded that "Hurricanes Katrina and Rita appear as exceptional cases", we found that Katrina scale disruptions would be relatively common, occurring on the order of once every 20 years. We should expect no production impact from hurricanes in only 10% of years, using all 155 years of available history as a guide. In this paper we start by describing the methodology used to forecast the impact of individual storms. Next we describe our verification process, followed by an assessment of the performance of the system in real time forecasting during the 2005 season. The results of simulating all storms since 1851 are discussed, followed by the potential for seasonal forecasts of GoM risks using climate signals such as the El Niño/Southern Oscillation. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our analyses for infrastructure design and resource management.
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
This month marks the start of another hurricane "season" in the Atlantic basin, a period that lasts from June to November. Last year's season—the costliest and most destructive on record—caused great damage to oil and gas facilities and infrastructure. The industry still has not completely recovered, although production has been gradually ramping up, and fore-casters predict another active storm season this year. At last month's Offshore Technology Conference, Johnnie Burton, Director of the U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS), recalled how fierce last year's storm season was. "The 2005 season was the first in which there were 27 named storms," she said. This included 15 hurricanes, and it also was the first time that three Category 5 hurricanes (storms with winds greater than 155 mph) crossed the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) in one season. "The only silver lining of that horrible black cloud was that there was no loss of life and there was no major pollution," she added. "That is really quite incredible when you look at the detail of what those hurricanes did and the force they applied to the (oil) facilities." Those storms—primarily Katrina and Rita in August and September, respectively—shut in more than 150 million bbl of oil and 749 Bcf of gas from the end of August to May 2006. More than 300,000 B/D of crude and 1.3 Bcf/D of gas was still shut in as of May 2006. Burton said that oil output is at about 80% pre-Katrina and -Rita levels, with three major platforms still undergoing repair. The GOM's storm woes really began in 2004 when Hurricane Ivan destroyed seven platforms and one rig. Then, last year, Katrina destroyed 47 platforms and four rigs and, 4 weeks later, Rita ruined 66 platforms and four rigs. The MMS still lists 79 platforms as evacuated. The industry is still assessing last year's damage even as the new season approaches. Much of the lost production came from destruction to infrastructure, including subsea pipelines. Numerous pipelines were seriously damaged, as were other facilities such as gas processing plants and terminals. Katrina and Rita caused deepwater drilling units to go adrift, and harm caused by the dragging of lines and anchors is still being studied. Rita capsized only one deepwater platform—Chevron's U.S. $250 million Typhoon, which was located about 160 miles south of New Orleans. The company plans to write off the platform, donating it to a program that takes decommissioned oil and gas structures and turns them into artificial reefs. Government and industry officials are still determining what changes need to be made in offshore structures to make them less vulnerable to these powerful storms. Universities also are researching the issue. A mild hurricane season would allow the industry to recover the production lost from last year's storms and completely assess and repair damage to production facilities. It would also take some heat off of oil prices, which continue to wade in record territory even as some global demand has cooled off. The 2005 hurricane season was, by many accounts, the worst in history. The bad news is that forecasters believe another stormy season is headed this way. Weather researchers at Colorado State U., one of the more closely watched hurricane predictors, believe the Atlantic basin will endure another very active storm season this year, though not as bad as last year. They forecast 17 named storms to form in the Atlantic, with nine of those becoming hurricanes and five developing into intense hurricanes with sustained winds of at least 111 mph.
- North America > United States > Colorado (0.35)
- North America > United States > Louisiana > Orleans Parish > New Orleans (0.25)
- North America > United States > Wyoming > Albany County > Laramie (0.15)
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
Abstract For most of the last three decades, the northern Gulf of Mexico has remained relatively free of large and powerful hurricanes. Basically, the tropical waters were relatively cool from 1970-1994. But in 1995, the pattern changed, and the Atlantic Basin heated up in more ways than one. Hurricanes have become more numerous and more powerful in recent years. A normal hurricane season would have 10 named storms, 6 of which would become hurricanes and two of those major hurricanes. There were 15 named storms in 2004, including 9 hurricanes and 6 major hurricanes. The 2005 season broke almost every record for activity with 27 named storms, 15 hurricanes, and 7 major hurricanes. The outlook for 2006 and beyond is not good. The recent pattern of significantly increased activity may well persist for decades. It's just a matter of time before another large and powerful hurricane impacts the northwest Gulf of Mexico. Introduction The 2004 hurricane season marked a significant upswing in major hurricane activity in the Gulf of Mexico. Massive Hurricane Ivan tracked across the central Gulf of Mexico in mid September. Ivan's winds of 135 to 150 mph generated some very large waves. Buoy 42040 located 64nm south of Dauphin Island, AL recorded significant waves as high as 50- 60 feet, and maximum waves were estimated to be in the 80 to 90 foot range. These waves wrought havoc on platforms off the southeast Louisiana coast, however it wasn't so much the intensity of Ivan's core as much as the great expanse of hurricane-force winds which produced such large waves. Figure 1: Buoy Locations in Northwest Gulf (available in fullpaper) As Ivan plowed through the drilling and production areas off the southeast Louisiana coast, its winds had dropped considerably, down to a Category 3 on the Saffir-Simpson scale. Theoretically, a Category 3 hurricane shouldn't have caused so much damage. Clearly, the Saffir-Simpson scale was not the best measurement of how potentially damaging a hurricane like Ivan might be because Ivan was no ‘normal’ Category 3 hurricane - its hurricane-force winds extended 100 or more miles from its center. It had been many years since such a large hurricane had impacted the waters of the northern Gulf of Mexico. Climatologically, hurricanes as large as Ivan are rare in the central and northern Gulf of Mexico, occurring perhaps once every few decades or longer. So it was generally thought to be unlikely that the 2005 hurricane season would be as active as far as the Gulf of Mexico was concerned. Such thoughts turned out to be quite wrong. 2005 Hurricane Season By all measurements, the 2005 hurricane season was the most active in recorded history, which extends more than 150 years into the past. With a total of 27 named storms, including fifteen hurricanes, seven major hurricanes, and four category 5 hurricanes, the 2005 hurricane season will be longremembered as the most destructive season on record, both offshore and inland across the northern Gulf of Mexico.
- North America > United States > Texas (0.48)
- North America > United States > Louisiana (0.46)
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- (3 more...)
Abstract Over the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the Gulf of Mexico experienced six Category 4+ hurricanes (Charlie, Ivan, Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). We have taken a close look at the past 106 years of data and find that while some storms are of similar intensity, there have apparently never been as many intense storms in such a short period. A byproduct of this search was the discovery that the intensity of some key storms in the early 20 century was underestimated. This could mean that in fact there were concentrated periods of intense storms earlier in the 1900's but these are obscured by the flaw in the early data. Another practical implication of the underestimate is that it can lead to a low bias in design winds and waves if they are derived from the entire 106-year data set. The amount of bias will depend on the specific region, the parameter of interest (e.g. winds), the data duration, etc. As an example, a deepwater site in the eastern Gulf referenced in [1] would have a 100-year significant wave height 1.5 m higher if the pre-1950 hurricanes are eliminated. This is about as important as including the effects of Ivan and Katrina at that site. Another way to look at this is that if the low biased pre-1950 period is removed, then 2004-2005 does not look as extraordinary. In other words we have a partial though not complete explanation for 2004-2005. With this in mind, we have examined three other possible explanations: global warming, natural long-term climate variability, and "chance". The case for global warming is weak. As for natural long-term climate variations, these are difficult to sort out with a database which contains only about 50 years of reliable data. Finally, we briefly examine the idea that "chance" or "bad luck" could explain 2004-2005. A simple probabilistic model is suggested which gives reasonable expected annual values. Further work with this model is planned in the future and it should resolve whether chance was indeed a probable explanation. Introduction Over the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the Gulf of Mexico experienced six Category 4+ hurricanes (Charlie, Ivan, Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). Three of the six caused major disruptions to gas and oil production, failure of a substantial number of facilities, and temporary increases in petroleum prices. Figure 1 shows the tracks of the four hurricanes affecting the northern Gulf. Dennis had the fifth lowest central pressure on record, despite the fact it occurred near the beginning of the 2005 hurricane season. Had it moved another 50 miles west it would have severely affected the oil patch as well. The 2005 season was particularly severe as a whole; all in all, there were 26 named storms in the N. Atlantic basin, of which 14 became hurricanes, both new records for the roughly 100 years of historical data available.
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (0.67)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (0.47)
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
Abstract The 2005 hurricane season will be forever remembered for the destruction delivered upon the Gulf of Mexico region. The one-two punch from Katrina and Rita battered eastern Texas to western Florida, causing massive damage and changed the course of life for millions. Due to planned evacuation of platforms in the Gulf, loss of life was avoided. However, the offshore oil and gas industry experienced the fury of these storms, with fixed and floating production structures, drilling rigs, and even pipelines suffering under the powerful winds and tall waves. The industry response was immediate in its efforts to ensure safety, bring relief to those affected in the community, and restore normalcy to the critical operations as quickly as possible. As the recovery efforts continue both onshore and offshore, the longer-term meaning of these events is beginning to be debated. Were Rita and Katrina extremely rare occurrences? Do these two hurricanes, together with Ivan in 2004, signal a need for recalibration of the design extremes? What changes are required to the way we work? Are the applicable codes, specifications, and recommended practices still appropriate? Has the risk been properly vetted in the new context of relatively few, but highly productive infrastructure points in the deepwater, and is it consistent from reservoir to refinery? Should temporarily moored rigs be better secured? The answer to these questions will significantly affect development decisions and the regulations under which work is executed in the future. A panel session is presented with members representing a broad swath of the industry to discuss the various stakeholder's response and potential changes in our characterization of the offshore Gulf of Mexico environment and the application of that new profile to the design and operation of oil and gas infrastructure. Preface This manuscript, while not necessarily representing the opinions of the panelists, is intended to set the stage for a panel discussion on 'The Gulf under Siege, The Effects of Katrina and Rita and the Future of the Gulf after Katrina and Rita' scheduled for Tuesday, May 2, 2006 at the Offshore Technical Conference. The panel participants will be:Joe Bastardi, Export Senior Forecaster, Accuweather, Chuck Enze, V.P. Shell International Exploration and Production Inc., Projects, Roger D. Leick, Marine Engineering Manager, ExxonMobil Development Company, Tim Juran, Division Manager-North America, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., Chris Oynes, Regional Director, Minerals Management Service, Steve Balint (Moderator), Engineering Manager, Shell International Exploration and Production Inc. Introduction The summer of 2005 will be remembered for the destruction delivered to the United States and Gulf Coast region by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Before making landfall, the hurricanesâ?? extreme characteristics were experienced by many of the offshore drilling and production platforms scattered around the continental shelf and beyond. While repairing the damage, the uniqueness of the 2005 hurricane season, with its large number of hurricanes and tropical storms, and the intensity of three of them, challenges us to re-examine the paradigm under which we view the E&P industry in the Gulf.
- Energy > Oil & Gas > Upstream (1.00)
- Government > Regional Government > North America Government > United States Government (0.48)
- South America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- North America > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Europe > Atlantic Basin (0.99)
- Africa > Atlantic Basin (0.99)