Production, refining, and distribution of petroleum products require many different types and sizes of storage tanks. Small bolted or welded tanks might be ideal for production fields while larger, welded storage tanks are used in distribution terminals and refineries throughout the world. Product operating conditions, storage capacities, and specific design issues can affect the tank selection process. Storage tanks come in all sizes and shapes. Special applications might require tanks to be rectangular, in the form of horizontal cylinders, or even spherical in shape.
In addition to the more immediate operating safety hazards, such as plugging blowout preventers, blocking drillstrings, and collapsing casing and drilling annuli, there are less obvious but very important safety hazards for removing hydrate plugs from flow channels. Hydrates cause safety problems for two reasons (both of which are shown schematically in Figs. The most common way to remove a hydrate plug from a flow channel is by depressurization. Flow is stopped, and the line is slowly depressurized from both ends of the plug. At atmospheric pressure, the hydrate stability temperature is invariably less than that of the surroundings, so heat flows from the environment into the hydrate plug.
There are different definitions of what is Well Integrity. The most widely accepted definition is given by NORSOK D-010: "Application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of a well." Other accepted definition is given by ISO TS 16530-2 "Containment and the prevention of the escape of fluids (i.e. Well Integrity is a multidisciplinary approach. Therefore, well integrity engineers need to interact constantly with different disciplines to assess the status of well barriers and well barrier envelopes at all times.
Historically health, safety, and environment (HSE) standards have been developed using a prescriptive management approach. A new, and potentially more effective, approach to the development of company HSE standards is to shift towards a more risk-based HSE strategy. The risk-based approach allows resources to be focused towards geographic locations, activities, and services that present higher risk to a company and its customers. Some risk-based HSE approaches involves setting prescribed fundamental controls that apply to all activities and employees at all company sites. While some controls apply without variation, the application of many controls increases proportionally with the assessed risk.
This approach helps to determine the depth of investigation requirements (in addition to actual severity). The hurt based approach is used to identify the integral potential and consistent actual severity of an incident and also used as a safety culture enabler. It helps to look significantly into incidents and possible ways to avert the reoccurrence. Figure 1 below gives an overview of how to apply hurt based on incidents. The "Nobody Gets Hurt" process has an additional layer to highlight the multiple fatality incidents that affect many people for very long times and also can greatly affect the health of a whole corporation.
Developing a corporate safety attitude to reduce and hopefully eliminate injuries, accidents and releases of toxic chemicals has been practiced for many years. The activities and technologies described below are interconnected with other safety approaches; however it is useful to consider them separately since they are primarily associated with different parts of most jobs.
Most threats to safety from production involve the release of hydrocarbons; therefore, the analysis and design of a production-facility safety system should focus on preventing such releases, stopping the flow of hydrocarbons to a leak if it occurs, and minimizing the effects of hydrocarbons should they be released. Ideally, hydrocarbon releases should never occur. Every process component is protected with two levels of protection: primary and secondary. The reason for two levels of protection is that if the first level fails to function properly, a secondary level of protection is available. If hydrocarbon releases occur (and, in spite of our best efforts, they sometimes do), inflow to the release site must be shut off as soon as possible. The problem should not be exacerbated with the continued release of additional hydrocarbons. Protective shut-in action is achieved by both the surface safety system (SSS) and the emergency support system (ESS). Shut-in systems are discussed in more detail in Sec. When hydrocarbons are released, their effects should be minimized as much as possible. This can be accomplished through the use of ignition-prevention measures and ESSs (i.e., the liquid-containment system). If oil spills from a process component, a release of hydrocarbons has occurred. A spill is never good, but component skids and deck drains (if offshore) minimize the effect of a bad situation when the spill would otherwise go into a freshwater stream or offshore waters. A hazard tree identifies potential hazards, determines the conditions necessary for a hazard to exist, determines sources that could create this condition, and breaks the chain leading to the hazard by eliminating the conditions and sources. Because complete elimination is normally not possible, the goal is to reduce the likelihood of occurrence.
The implementation of a transportation management system has been evolving into a core business practice in the oil and gas industry. This management approach is assisting in the coordinating the efforts of people to accomplish goals and objectives using resources already available in an effective and efficient way. Management's purpose is to coordinate the efforts of people so they can accomplish goals and objectives using available resources efficiently and effectively. A management system comprises of planning, organizing, staffing, leading or directing, and controlling an organization to accomplish set goals. Management sizes can range from one person in a small business to thousands of managers in international organizations.
The growth and evolution of offshore drilling units have gone from an experiment in the 1940s and 1950s with high hopes but unknown outcome to the extremely sophisticated, high-end technology and highly capable units of the 1990s and 2000s. In less than 50 years, the industry progressed from drilling in a few feet of water depth with untested equipment and procedures to the capability of drilling in more than 10,000 ft of water depth with well-conceived and highly complex units. These advances are a testament to the industry and its technical capabilities driven by the vision and courage of its engineers, crews, and management. From an all-American start to its present worldwide, multinational involvement, anyone involved can be proud to be called a "driller." Since the beginning in the mid-1800s until today, the drilling business commercially has been very cyclic. It has been and still is truly a roller-coaster ride, with rigs being built at premium prices in good economic times and ...